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Social Security disability cases pose many challenges. In practice, federal court review of Social Security agency decisions differs widely from district to district and from circuit to circuit. This pocket guide is a primer for judges deciding Social Security disability appeals at the district court level. It addresses issues that regularly arise in these appeals and highlights relevant provisions in the U.S. Code, the Code of Federal Regulations, and the Federal Register.

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Commencement of Proceedings Defined | Article 12 Defense | Settlement

In this case, a father petitioned for the return of his child to Guatemala sixteen months after the child’s removal by its mother. In the father’s procedural objections, he sought to establish that the availability of an Article 12 delay defense is triggered by the later of either (1) the filing a civil petition in the court having jurisdiction, or (2) the filing of an administrative petition. He also sought to establish that under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9011, a delay defense fails unless an Article 13b or Article 20 defense is also proven, and he argued that the evidence of the child’s settlement was insufficient.

Facts

A father and mother, citizens of Guatemala, separated shortly after the birth of their only child in 2010. They divorced in 2014. The mother began a relationship with Deleon, a man who lived in New Jersey. In 2014, she married Deleon and, without the father’s consent, brought their child to the United States to live. She disclosed to the father that she was in New Jersey with the child, but she did not disclose their address. The father commenced an administrative application for the child’s return to Guatemala in August of 2014. When he discovered that an actual petition to a court in the United States was necessary, he filed his petition for return in the District Court of New Jersey in January of 2016—sixteen months after the child’s departure from Guatemala. 

The district court denied his petition for return, finding that the child was settled in New Jersey. Neither the mother, her new husband, nor the child had legal immigration status in the United States, but the mother and her husband both had pending petitions for asylum. The Third Circuit affirmed.

Discussion

Commencement of Proceedings. The Third Circuit found that the father had been diligent in attempting to secure the return of his child and acknowledged that he did not speak English, could not afford counsel, and did not know the child’s address. However, the court declined to find that these factors equitably served to extend the requirement that an actual petition be filed in court to commence return proceedings. The plain language of 22 U.S.C. § 9003(f)(3) requires the actual commencement of a civil proceeding for the one-year delay defense to apply under Article 12. The court noted that it does nevertheless have authority to order a child’s return even in the face of a successful delay defense.

Delay Defense Does Not Require Proof of Additional Defenses. The father argued that the language of ICARA required an Article 12 defense to be accompanied by proof of an Article 13b or Article 20 defense. This was based on the language in ICARA stating that the person opposing return had the burden of proving

(A) by clear and convincing evidence that one of the exceptions set forth in article 13b or 20 of the Convention applies; and

(B) by a preponderance of the evidence that any other exception set forth in article 12 or 13 of the Convention applies.”[1]

He argued that Congress intended to require proof of the existence of multiple defenses by the placement of the word “and” instead of “or” between paragraphs (A) and (B). The court disagreed, pointing to the text of the 1980 Hague Convention, its underlying principles, and precedent.[2] The court also noted that the defenses under the 1980 Convention were meant to apply individually and that it would strain reason to require that a party raising one defense must also establish an independent and potentially unrelated defense.

Settlement of the Child. The father challenged the district court’s finding that the child was settled in his new environment, but the Third Circuit reviewed the district court’s thorough analysis[3] and summarily disposed of the father’s argument.

[T]he District Court undertook an exceedingly thorough, careful, and thoughtful analysis of the evidence and the various factors that pertain to how well a child is settled in a community and home. We are satisfied that this record supports the District Court’s finding that H.C. is well settled in his new environment.[4]

The district court had acknowledged that neither the mother, her husband, nor the child were legal residents in the United States and that all had applied for asylum. But the district court ruled that immigration status was not dispositive of the settlement issue and found that the child in this case was settled,[5] which the Third Circuit affirmed.


[1]. 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2) (emphasis added).
[2]. Monzon v. De La Roca, 910 F.3d 92, 102–105 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224 (2014)).
[3]. Castellanos Monzón v. De La Roca, Civil Action No. 16-0058 (FLW)(LHG), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45825, at *38–40 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2016) (“[T]he factors . . . include: (1) the age of the child; (2) the stability of the child’s new residence; (3) whether the child attends school or daycare consistently; (4) whether the child attends church regularly; (5) the stability of the parent’s employment or other means of support; (6) whether the child has friends and relatives in the area; (7) to what extent the child has maintained ties to the country of habitual residence; (8) the level of parental involvement in the child’s life; (9) active measures to conceal the child’s whereabouts (and the possibility of criminal prosecution related thereto); and, (10) the immigration status of the child and parent.”).
[4]. Monzon, 910 F.3d at 105–106 (citations omitted).
[5]. Monzón, Civil Action No. 16-0058 (FLW)(LHG), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45825, at *46–48.

This document is part of The 1980 Hague Convention on International Child Abduction: A Resource for Judges, a Special Topic Webpage.

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Article 18 Discretion to Return Child | Settlement | Repeated Abductions

Article 18 of the1980 Hague Convention provides that “[t]he provisions of this Chapter do not limit the power of a judicial or administrative authority to order the return of the child at any time.” This case examines the parameters of the court’s discretion to order a child returned to his or her habitual residence despite an abducting parent’s successful establishment of an Article 12 defense.

Facts

In 2009, a mother abducted her twin sons from Panama to Missouri. Granting the father’s petition for return, the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri ordered the children’s return to Panama.[1] In response to that order, the mother returned to Panama with the children. Thereafter the father visited the children regularly on weekends. In 2013, he retained the children for two months in violation of the parties’ custody agreement. Upon the mother’s application, a Panamanian judge ordered the children returned to their mother. The father did not see or speak with the children for the next eleven months—each parent blaming the other for the hiatus in the father’s visits.

The parents continued to litigate custody issues in the Panamanian court. The court issued an order restraining the mother from removing the children from Panama. Despite that order, in February 2014, she took the children to Florida without notifying the father. He made efforts to locate the children but was unsuccessful until January 2015, when he learned that the children were in the United States.

In April 2016, the father petitioned for return of the children in the District Court for the Middle District of Florida—two-and-a-half years after their abduction. The mother raised three defenses: grave risk of harm, the objections of the children, and the fact that the children were settled in their new environment.

The Florida district court denied the father’s petition for return, finding that the children were settled in their new environment within the meaning of Article 12. Although the district court recognized that it retained discretion to return the children despite the fact that they were settled, it declined to do so on the basis that the children’s interests in being settled outweighed the benefits of returning them to Panama.[2] The Eleventh Circuit reversed.

Discussion

Settlement of the Child. The Eleventh Circuit first discussed the concept of a child’s settlement in his or her new environment, noting that the concept of settlement must consider not only the child’s situation in the new place, but the child’s attachments to the habitual residence. The court found that a child is settled when the evidence has shown that “the child has significant connections to their new home that indicate that the child has developed a stable, permanent, and nontransitory life in their new country to such a degree that return would be to the child’s detriment.”[3] The court went on to clarify that “[a]lthough all returns will necessarily involve some level of disruption to the child or children involved, we caution that disruption should not be considered per sedetrimental. Rather, the “settled” inquiry requires courts to carefully consider the totality of the circumstances.”[4]

Discretion to Return the Child. The Eleventh Circuit cited authority from cases in the First, Second, and Fourth Circuits that give courts the discretion to order a “settled” child returned.[5] The court cautioned against the exercise of broad discretion to return a settled child where such an exercise would render Article 12’s defense a “dead letter”[6] or plunge the court into issues related to determining custody. Nevertheless, the circuit court found that Article 18 of the 1980 Convention grants courts the discretion to order a child returned despite the fact that an Article 12 defense to return has been established.

Repeated Abductions and Factors Weighing in Favor of Exercise of Article 18 Discretion. The court found the instant case unique because this was the second time within five years that the mother had abducted the children from Panama to the United States. The Eleventh Circuit found that the district court had given insufficient weight to “the audacity . . . of a second removal.”[7] Also, since the Panamanian court was still presiding over the child custody case, this case raised the question of comity between nations and judicial authorities. Lastly, holding child custody proceedings in Florida would disadvantage the father because he would be unable to attend those proceedings[8]—a forum-shopping victory for the mother that would be contrary to the underlying principles of the 1980 Convention.


[1]. Fernandez v. Bailey, No. 1:10CV00084 SNLJ, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90368 (E.D. Mo. Sep. 1, 2010).
[2]. “Furthermore, the Court believes that the children’s interest in settlement in this case outweighs the other interests that would be served by returning the children to Panama. The Court is deeply disturbed by Respondent’s actions. This is the second time Respondent has removed the children from Panama without Petitioner’s consent. Because Petitioner had been unable to secure a visa to attend the 2010 Hague Convention hearing because of his prior conviction, Respondent likely knew that Petitioner could not travel to the United States to search for the children or participate in person if future custody proceedings were initiated here. As Petitioner correctly pointed out, preventing this type of forum-shopping by parents was a major motivation for the enactment of the Hague Convention.” Fernandez ex rel. C.R.F.B. v. Bailey, No. 8:16-cv-2444-T-33TGW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128732 (M.D. Fla. Sep. 21, 2016).
[3]. Fernandez v. Bailey, 909 F.3d 353, 361 (11th Cir. 2018).
[4]. Id.
[5]. Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2013); Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 164 (2d Cir. 2001); Alcala v. Hernandez, 826 F.3d 161, 175 (4th Cir. 2016).
[6]. Fernandez, 909 F.3d at 361 (quoting Gomez v. Fuenmayor, 812 F.3d 1005, 1011 (11th Cir. 2016)).
[7]. Id. at 364.
[8]. The father is not permitted to enter the United States due to a prior juvenile conviction for felony burglary.

This document is part of The 1980 Hague Convention on International Child Abduction: A Resource for Judges, a Special Topic Webpage.

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Beginning on June 1, 2017, the Northern District of Illinois is participating in a three-year pilot project known as the “Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Project,” which is studying whether requiring parties in civil cases to respond to a series of standard discovery requests before undertaking other discovery reduces the cost and delay of civil litigation. In this pilot project, when making mandatory initial discovery responses parties are required to disclose both favorable and unfavorable information that is relevant to their claims or defenses regardless of whether they intend to use the information in their cases.

General Order 17-0005 specifies that a Standing Order will be entered in all covered cases. The Standing Order, In re Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Program in the Northern District of Illinois, explains the parties’ obligations under the pilot project and sets forth the initial discovery requests to which the parties must respond. All civil cases assigned to participating judges, except those categories of cases exempted by the Standing Order, are included in the pilot program and subject to the Standing Order.

A Federal Judicial Center website displays additional information about the Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Project in the Northern District of Illinois.

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Beginning as early as May 1, 2017, some district courts are participating in a three-year pilot project known as the “Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Project,” which is studying whether requiring parties in civil cases to respond to a series of standard discovery requests before undertaking other discovery reduces the cost and delay of civil litigation. In this pilot project, when making mandatory initial discovery responses parties are required to disclose both favorable and unfavorable information that is relevant to their claims or defenses regardless of whether they intend to use the information in their cases.

Participating district courts have adopted a Standing Order explaining the parties’ obligations under the pilot project and setting forth the initial discovery requests to which the parties must respond. All civil cases, except those categories of cases exempted by the Standing Order, are included in the pilot program and subject to the Standing Order.

These are some of the key requirements under the Standing Order:

  • At the Rule 26(f) conference, parties must discuss the mandatory initial discovery listed in the Standing Order and describe their discussions (including limitations invoked and disputes) in their Rule 26(f) report.
  • Parties must provide the requested information as to facts that are relevant to the parties’ claims and defenses, whether favorable or unfavorable, and regardless of whether they intend to use the information in presenting their claims and defenses. 
  • Parties must file answers, counterclaims, cross-claims, and replies within the time set forth in Rule 12(a)(1)–(3), even if they have filed or intend to file a motion to dismiss or other preliminary motion. 
  • Parties must serve their initial discovery responses by the deadlines described in the Standing Order unless modified by the court.
  • Parties must address certain issues relating to electronically stored information (ESI) and produce ESI by the deadline set in the Standing Order.
  • Pilot judges should hold initial case-management conferences within the time set in Rule 16(b)(2) and discuss the parties’ compliance with the mandatory discovery obligations.

 
Currently there are two courts participating in this pilot project:

 
A Federal Judicial Center website displays additional information about the Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Project.

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Habitual Residence | Infants

This case addressed what standard should be used to determine the habitual residence of an infant who has lived in only one location prior to the its wrongful removal. A father petitioned for the return of his six-week-old child to Italy, where the child was born and had lived exclusively before the mother wrongfully removed the child to the United States.

Facts

In 2011, the father, an Italian citizen studying at the University of Illinois, met and married the mother, also a student at that university. In 2013, the couple decided to move to Italy for their careers. The father was licensed to practice medicine in Italy, and the mother received two fellowships for further study in Italy. The father moved to Italy first, in February 2013; the mother later followed. Before her move, she sent an email to the father indicating that she did not believe “[the fact that we are moving to Milan or Rome] means we are done with the US [for good].”

The mother became pregnant in May 2014. The father became sexually and physically abusive. The parties’ relationship deteriorated, and they discussed divorce. The mother applied for U.S. jobs but also made plans to have the child in Italy. After one of her pregnancy check-ups in mid-February, she began having contractions. The father remained at their apartment while she took a taxi to the hospital. Their versions of why he did not immediately join her conflicted. The father arrived at the hospital later for the birth. The child was delivered by emergency caesarean section. After the birth, the father returned to the parties’ apartment, and the mother went to a residence in Basiglio, a suburb of Milan. The parties briefly reconciled but separated shortly thereafter due to arguments and the father’s alleged threats of physical harm to the mother.

On April 15, 2015, the mother left for the United States with the parties’ six-week-old child. Various factors influenced her eventual move back to the United States: her inability to obtain recognition of her academic credentials Italy, her lack of Italian language skills, and her complicated pregnancy. Less than a month later, the father commenced an action under the Hague Convention for the return of the child. In March 2016, the district court held a four-day trial. In October 2016, the district court found that Italy was the child’s habitual residence and granted father’s petition for the child’s return. Stays requested by the mother were denied, and the child was returned to Italy. The mother appealed, but the judgment was affirmed by a divided panel in Taglieri v. Monasky, 876 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 2017). A petition for an en banc hearing was granted, resulting in the opinion discussed in this commentary.

Discussion

Habitual Residence. The Sixth Circuit reiterated its holding in Ahmed v. Ahmed[1] that the circuit considers two factors when determining habitual residence: (1) whether the child has become acclimatized, and (2) whether a shared parental intent existed. The second factor is considered a backup test when the child in question is too young or disabled to become acclimatized. The court noted that every circuit to consider the issue of habitual residence looks to both standards.[2] Acclimatization typically involves factors such as academic activities, social connections, sports activities, excursions, and the formation of meaningful connections with people and places. Here, the court noted that the age of the child foreclosed consideration of acclimatization as a method to determine habitual residence. Thus, the district court had properly looked to shared parental intent as the appropriate test in this case.

The district court had resolved the issue of habitual residence in the face of the conflicting evidence and arguments of the parties. In affirming the district court’s finding that Italy was the child’s habitual residence, the Sixth Circuit panel gave great weight to the factual determinations the district court made after the four-day trial. The panel applied a clear error standard of review: “[W]e leave this work to the district court unless the fact findings ‘strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish.’” Recognizing that there was evidence in the record that could have supported the conclusion that the child’s habitual residence was in the United States instead of Italy, the Sixth Circuit deferred to the district judge and concluded that he

had the authority to rule in either direction. He could have found that Italy was A.M.T.’s habitual residence or he could have found that the United States was her habitual residence. After fairly considering all of the evidence, he found that Italy was A.M.T.’s habitual residence. . . . Call our standard of review what you will—clear-error review, abuse-of-discretion review, five-week-old-fish review—we have no warrant to second-guess Judge Oliver’s well-considered finding.[3]

The district court had found that the parties shared intent was to raise the child in Italy, and the Sixth Circuit found that the district court had used the proper test for determining habitual residence. In the absence of clear error, the district court’s decision should be affirmed.

The en banc court also rejected the mother’s argument that the district court had erred because there was never a showing that there was a “meeting of the minds” between the father and mother regarding the child’s habitual residence. The circuit court noted that such an agreement is not required for a finding that the parties had a shared intent.

An absence of a subjective agreement between the parents does not by itself end the inquiry. Otherwise, it would place undue weight on one side of the scale. Ask the products of any broken marriage, and they are apt to tell you that their parents did not see eye to eye on much of anything by the end. If adopted, [the mother’s] approach would create a presumption of no habitual residence for infants, leaving the population most vulnerable to abduction the least protected.[4]

Concurring Opinion of Judge Boggs. Judge Boggs agreed with the result in the majority opinion, but he pointed out that strict adherence to Ahmed’s binary choice between the acclimatization test or the shared parental intent test opens up the possibility that the child might be found to have no habitual residence. Judge Boggs suggested that absent unusual circumstances, if a child has lived exclusively in one country, that country should be the child’s habitual residence. The failure to recognize such a rule could result in a court making a finding that neither acclimatization nor shared intent exists. This conclusion would produce a determination that an infant has no habitual residence—relegating parents to self-help as a remedy for abductions. This result, Judge Boggs concluded, ignores the purposes of the 1980 Hague Convention.

Three Separate Dissenting Opinions: Judge Moore, Judge Gibbons, and Judge Stranch. The dissenting opinions all noted that the district court’s decision was rendered before the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Ahmed. As a result, that court had not analyzed the case within the parameters later set forth in Ahmed. The dissenters also found that the district court determined shared parental intent on the basis of where the parents had actually established a residence, rather than where they intended to live. Judge Moore wrote that courts must look to the external indicia of the parties’ shared intent. Judge Moore also pointed out that although a habitual residence determination is essentially a question of fact, whether the district court used the proper standard for determining habitual residence is a matter to be reviewed de novo by an appellate court. Judges Gibbons and Stranch observed that Ahmeddefined the shared intent test to reflect the parents’ intention for the child’s residence. However, the district court focused on the parents’ established marital residence in Italy and mother’s failure to leave that residence after the birth of the child. The dissenters agreed that the case should be remanded for the district court to reanalyze the case in light of Ahmed.


[1]. 867 F.3d 682 (6th Cir. 2017).
[2]. Taglieri v. Monasky, 907 F.3d 404, 407–408 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Every circuit to consider the question looks to both standards.”) (citing Ahmed,867 F.3d at 689; Mauvais v. Herisse, 772 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 2014); Guzzo v. Cristofano, 719 F.3d 100, 110 (2d Cir. 2013); Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280, 296 (3d Cir. 2006); Maxwell v. Maxwell, 588 F.3d 245, 253 (4th Cir. 2009); Larbie v. Larbie, 690 F.3d 295, 310 (5th Cir. 2012); Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 746 (7th Cir. 2013); Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 918 (8th Cir. 2010); Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1020 (9th Cir. 2004); Kanth v. Kanth, No. 99-4246, 2000 WL 1644099, at *1–2 (10th Cir. Nov. 2, 2000); Chafin v. Chafin, 742 F.3d 934, 938–39 (11th Cir. 2013)).
[3]. Id. at 409.
[4]. Id. at 410.

This document is part of The 1980 Hague Convention on International Child Abduction: A Resource for Judges, a Special Topic Webpage.

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Habitual Residence

This case addressed whether abduction acts as a bar to the establishment of a child’s habitual residence in the country to which the child was taken. The Sixth Circuit found that resort to self-help and failure to pursue an action for return of a child under the Hague Convention may result in a change in the child’s habitual residence.

A child was abducted by her mother from the U.S. to Ecuador in 2009. The child remained in Ecuador for seven years and formed attachments indicating that she had become acclimatized to Ecuador as her habitual residence. In 2016, father refused to return the child to Ecuador after summer visitation. Mother petitioned for the return of the child to Ecuador.

Facts

In violation of a Michigan custody order, mother initially abducted the parties’ daughter to Ecuador in 2009. Although father commenced the administrative process for return of the child, he failed to follow through with filing a case in Ecuador for the child’s return under the 1980 Convention. In 2016, mother permitted the child to travel to the United States to visit her father for the summer. Father failed to return the child as previously agreed by the parties. In 2017, mother petitioned for the return of the child to Ecuador. The district court acknowledged that the child lived in Ecuador from age three to ten and that she “had been acclimatized to Ecuador and was settled there.” Nevertheless, the district court denied mother’s petition for return based on the illegality of abducting the child to Ecuador in 2009. The court concluded that the child’s habitual residence was in the United States.

Discussion

Abduction does not act as a bar to the establishment of a child’s habitual residence. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for additional proceedings. The Sixth Circuit adhered to its former precedents defining habitual residence for children above the “age of cognizance” as “the nation where, at the time of [her] removal, the child has been present long enough to allow ‘acclimatization,’ and where this presence has a ‘degree of settled purpose from the child’s perspective.’”[1]Here, all the facts pointed toward the conclusion that over the course of seven years, the child had acclimatized to Ecuador as her habitual residence. The court reasoned that reabduction involves the same threats to a child’s wellbeing because it interferes with the child’s “accustomed residence.” The court found that living in Ecuador for seven years, along with social, family, and school attachments established that the child lived in that nation with a “settled purpose.”

Self-help and the failure to pursue return of the child under the 1980 Convention. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that failure to initiate or follow through with the established procedures under the 1980 Convention for seeking the return of an abducted child may result in adverse consequences to the case of the parent left behind. First, a parent that resorts to self-help reabduction forecloses consideration and adherence to the safeguards that exist under the Hague Convention relating to the child’s welfare, the possible objections of a mature child, and the time limits that are built into the application process. Secondly, reabduction poses the same threats to the child’s wellbeing as an initial abduction, when the child has become acclimatized to the country to which they were originally abducted.

The court found support in Ovalle v. Perez[2]for reaching the conclusion that reabduction was not a favored form of relief where a party failed to take advantage of the 1980 Convention to resolve issues surrounding the determination of a child’s habitual residence. In Ovalle, father took the parties’ child from Guatemala to the United States by subterfuge. The court found that the parents had never formed a settled intent as to where the infant would be raised. The Ovallecourt took account of the factors indicating the child’s settled status in Guatemala: the child lived with mother and family; the child had regular visits to a pediatrician; there were plans for baptism and church attendance; and father was permitted to be with the child in Guatemala. The court found that father’s resort to self-help was a factor that weighed against a finding that the child’s habitual residence was in the United States.

Both Morenoand the Ovallecase relied on the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Kijowska v. Haines[3]on the potential impact of self-help reabductions. In Kijowaska,a two-month-old child was taken by her mother to Poland, mother’s country of residence. Four months later, mother and child returned to the United States in an apparent attempt to reconcile with the child’s father. Meanwhile, father had obtained a custody decree from an Illinois court, and when mother and the child arrived, father convinced U.S. immigration authorities that mother was planning to overstay her visa. The immigration authorities took the child from mother and gave the child to father pursuant to the Illinois order. Mother was refused entrance into the United States, compelling her to return to Poland without the child. Granting mother’s application for return of the child under the Hague Convention, the Kijowskacourt found that the child’s habitual residence was Poland. The court reasoned that even if mother’s removal of the child to Poland was wrongful, father’s self-help conduct bypassed the provisions of the Hague Convention and contributed to the child’s establishment of a habitual residence in Poland.

[Father]’s remedy would have been to file a petition under the Hague Convention and its implementing federal statute. He did not do that. He merely sought a custody order from an Illinois state court and then used that order to help obtain the self-help remedy of taking the child from the airport. To give a legal advantage to an abductor who has a perfectly good legal remedy in lieu of abduction yet failed to pursue it would be contrary to the Hague Convention’s goal of discouraging abductions by denying to the abductor any legal advantage from the abduction. By failing to pursue his legal remedy, [father] enabled [the child] to obtain a habitual residence in the country to which her mother took her, even if the initial taking was wrongful.[4]


[1]. Moreno v. Zank, 895 F.3d 917, 923 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 993 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1995)).
[2]. Ovalle v. Perez, 681 Fed. App’x 777 (11th Cir. 2017).
[3]. 463 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2006).
[4]. Kijowska v. Haines, 463 F.3d 583, 588–589 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).

This document is part of The 1980 Hague Convention on International Child Abduction: A Resource for Judges, a Special Topic Webpage.

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A checklist itemizing the procedural requirements of the Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Project. The checklist is designed to be helpful to judges presiding over pilot cases and to attorneys participating in pilot cases as pilot requirements apply to the initial stages of discovery. The pilot project is scheduled to begin in participating courts as early as May 1, 2017.

Currently there are two courts participating in this pilot project:

 
A Federal Judicial Center website displays additional information about the Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Project.

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A detailed description of the Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Project, which began in participating courts as early as May 1, 2017.

Currently there are two courts participating in this pilot project:

 
A Federal Judicial Center website displays additional information about the Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Project.

In Print: Available for Distribution

Science tutorials have developed as a tool to assist judges in managing cases that involve complex science and technology. Such tutorials provide an early opportunity for the court to learn and ask questions about relevant science and technology outside the context of motion practice. Courts should consider holding science tutorials in cases that involve recent scientific findings or newer technologies, where scientific assertions are central to claims or defenses, or when scientific or technological information is likely to play a large role in later dispositive motions. This guide provides an overview of practical considerations to help judges plan and conduct science tutorials effectively.

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