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Resources for Public Speaking: Judicial Administration
The administration of the work of the courts has been subject to significant change throughout the judiciary’s history. Perhaps the most important shift was a gradual evolution away from the use of various executive agencies to perform administrative roles. During the twentieth century, these duties were gradually assumed by bodies within the judicial branch, such as the Judicial Conference of the United States (founded in 1922 as the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges) and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (founded in 1939). This resource introduces the important inflection points in this evolution as well as the establishment of regularized rulemaking and disciplinary processes during the twentieth century. It provides suggested talking points, in outline form, for those wishing to speak about changes in the administration of the federal courts. In addition to the outline, the resource contains Topic at a Glance, a brief summary in PDF format; a gallery of downloadable images for use in a PowerPoint presentation; links to related resources on the FJC’s History of the Federal Judiciary website; a further reading list; and excerpts of historical documents that could be handed out to audience members or incorporated into a presentation.
Download PDFs: Judicial Administration - Topic at a Glance.pdf (138.29 KB) Judicial Administration - Full Unit.pdf (310.52 KB)
Barrows, Chester L., and William M. Evarts. Lawyer, Diplomat, Statesman. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1941.
Crowe, Justin. Building the Judiciary: Law, Courts and the Politics of Institutional Development. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012.
Fish, Peter Graham. The Politics of Federal Judicial Administration. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973.
Murphy, Walter F. “Chief Justice Taft and the Lower Court Bureaucracy: A Study in Judicial Administration.” Journal of Politics 24 (1962): 453–76.
Shelton, a leading figure in the American Bar Association, contended that legislatures injected political influences into the judicial process and produced ineffective judicial administration, though it was the courts that were attacked by the public. He called on Congress to “let the Supreme Court free,” allowing it to function as an independent branch of government and create a model of rational, effective procedure for the country. Only then would interest-group and partisan influences be removed from the administration of justice.
The times call for a more general and popular study of the elementary principles of government that the body politic may realize that the difficulty is not with the Courts as institutions, but with the conduct thereof. . . . The solution, I profoundly believe, lies much in divorcing the Courts from politics and political influences and requiring them and the Bar to clean their own house. . . .
Pursuing this thought, if lawyers and judges are to be held solely responsible, as in right they should, then they must be given the power to correct the evil by putting into practice all necessary reforms in the Courts. . . . The people should rise up in their might and require that Congress shall set the Supreme Court free. It is a complete solution of the difficulty. . . . Congress should be prevailed upon to do away with the empty pretense of conformity with State practice on the common law side, . . . stop patching conflicting and incompatible statutes, authorize the Federal Supreme Court to prepare a simple, economical, complete, correlated system of pleading and procedure, make it mandatory and stop there. Let the Supreme Court do the rest. . . . Besides, politics have no respective place in jurisprudence. On the other hand, the solemn voice of the Supreme Court would bring the entire Bar and the people to a point of complete acquiescence and the forceful support and there would be permanent results the greatest of which, next to simplicity and economy, would be uniformity in pleading and procedure in the Federal Courts and quite naturally amongst the States. In their own interests, there would eventually be adopted any simple, economical system that bears the impramata [sic] of the approval of the United States Supreme Court; that has proved its merits in the Federal Courts and which has become certain and fixed through precedents.
[Document Source: Thomas W. Shelton, “Reform and Uniformity of Judicial Procedure,” Central Law Journal, February 14, 1913, 114–16.]
Taft advocated for the creation of the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges throughout 1921. In the 1910s, Taft had described his idea of a council of judges as a way to study conditions in the courts and assist in decisions regarding the reassignment of judges. In a 1921 speech to the American Bar Association, Taft also stated that he saw the Conference as a way to pierce the independence of the district courts and encourage what he often referred to as “teamwork” among the individual judges.
In the bill is another important feature that in a sense contains the kernel of the whole progress intended by the bill. It provides for an annual meeting of the Chief Justice, the senior circuit judges from the nine circuits, and the Attorney-General, to consider required reports from district judges and clerks as to the business in their respective districts, with a view to making a yearly plan for increasing for the time the new and old judicial force of the United States where the arrears are threatening to interfere with the usefulness of the courts. It is the introduction into our judicial system of an executive principle to secure effective team work. Heretofore each judge has paddled his own canoe and has done the best he could with his district. He has been subject to little supervision, if any. Judges are men and some are not so keenly charged with the duty of constant labor that the stimulus of an annual inquiry into what they are doing may not be helpful. With such mild visitation he is likely to cooperate much more readily in an organized effort to get rid of business and do justice than under the “go-as-you-please” system of our present federal judges which has left unemployed in easy districts a good deal of the judicial energy that may be now usefully applied elsewhere.
[Document Source: “Informal Address by Honorable William Howard Taft,” Report of the 44th Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association (1921), 564–65.]
Judge Alfred Murrah of the Tenth Circuit was perhaps more intimately involved in studying the problem of complex litigation in the federal courts than any other judge, having done so in various capacities since 1955. Murrah, in a sense, wrote the book on the subject as head of the group that produced the Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases in 1960. The judge appeared before the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery in 1966 to express his support for the creation of a centralized body to oversee the consolidation of pretrial procedures in multidistrict federal litigation.
As you are fully aware, a virtual “explosion” of litigation has occurred since World War II in all levels of the judiciary. Courts have received and are continuing to receive additional numbers of judges and court personnel. Perhaps this is inevitable in view of the “population explosion” and our expanding economy. But experience has shown and the Judicial Conference of the United States has recognized that the creation of additional judgeships is not the complete answer to the management of judicial caseload. Despite more judges the backlogs of cases continually grow. It is our view that the courts must learn better ways of handling litigation efficiently through the development of new techniques of calendar control and overall judicial administration.
The proposed legislation we are concerned with here today deals with a facet of this overall problem. It is a new and intriguing problem—because it is one peculiar to our modern society. It is the “big case” with geographical dispersion. . . .
At the time of the promulgation of the new Handbook [of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases], no one could foresee the deluge of antitrust litigation about to descend upon the United States district courts. In 1951 . . . there were 262 antitrust cases commenced in the district courts; in 1960 . . . there were 315 antitrust cases commenced. But in 1962 the number of antitrust cases docketed in the district courts increased to 2,079. This resulted, of course, from the 1,739 private antitrust cases filed that year as the result of the indictments and convictions in the electrical equipment industry in Philadelphia in 1961. While the Handbook showed the way in litigation confined to a single district, it provided little help in the coordination of thousands of related cases pending in more than 30 jurisdictions across the nation. . . .
The one principle that stands out foremost in the work on the electrical equipment cases is the need for centralized judicial control to avoid duplication of time and effort and the waste of funds. In the electrical cases control was splendidly achieved through judicial cooperation and through the cooperation of members of the Bar. While the necessary control was achieved, it was done so only through hard work. It was apparent from this experience that a loosening of the statutes relating to venue and the transfer of cases in relation to multi-district cases, was not only desirable but necessary. The bill which you have before you, which bears the endorsement in principle of the Judicial Conference of the United States, would accomplish just this.
Mr. Chairman, the Federal judiciary in the last ten years has, on its own resources, made immense strides forward in mastering the protracted and complex case. Certainly, the big case no longer threatens, as it once did, a breakdown in the judicial process. In this instance, we ask the Congress to join with us to provide additional tools to help us in the task of the administration of Justice.
[Document Source: U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings on S. 3815, A Proposal to Provide Pretrial Consolidation of Multidistrict Litigation, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 1966, pt. 1, 51–53.]



