

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE:
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
TELECOMMUNICATIONS RECORDS
LITIGATION

MDL Docket No 06-1791 VRW
ORDER

This Document Relates To:
07-1187, 07-1242, 07-1323,
07-1324, 07-1326, 07-1396

The government seeks to enjoin state officials in Missouri, Maine, New Jersey, Connecticut and Vermont from investigating various telecommunication carriers concerning their alleged disclosure of customer telephone records to the National Security Agency (NSA) based on the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the foreign affairs power of the federal government and the state secrets privilege.

Before these cases were transferred to this court by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) on February 15, 2007, the government and various defendants filed cross motions for dismissal and summary judgment. With the exception of reply briefs in the Connecticut and Vermont cases, these motions were fully briefed prior to transfer. The court's scheduling order directed the parties to complete briefing in the Connecticut and Vermont cases and permitted the government and state officials to submit consolidated briefs addressing Ninth Circuit law and other issues not previously briefed. Doc #219.

1 Clayton v AT&T, 07-1187, arises out of investigative
2 subpoenas issued to AT&T by two commissioners of the Missouri
3 Public Service Commission (MoPSC) regarding information it
4 allegedly disclosed to the NSA. Doc #1, Ex A. These subpoenas
5 seek, for example,

6 (1) Any order, subpoena or directive of any court,
7 tribunal or administrative agency or office
8 whatsoever, directing or demanding the release of
customer proprietary information relating to
Missouri customers;

9 (2) The number of Missouri customers, if any, whose
10 calling records have been delivered or otherwise
disclosed to the [NSA]; and

11 (3) The nature or type of information disclosed to the
12 NSA, including telephone number, subscriber name
13 and address, social security numbers, calling
14 patterns, calling history, billing information,
credit card information, internet data and the
like.

15 Doc #299, Ex A, tab 3.

16 Because the commissioners considered AT&T's response to
17 be inadequate, they moved pursuant to Missouri law to compel AT&T
18 to comply with the investigation in Missouri state court. AT&T
19 then removed the case to the United States District Court for the
20 Western District of Missouri. Shortly thereafter, the government
21 initiated a separate Missouri action, United States v Gaw, 07-1242,
22 on July 26, 2006, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
the MoPSC and AT&T.

23 The Maine case, United States v Adams, 07-1323, began
24 after Maine citizens petitioned the Maine Public Utilities
25 Commission (MePUC) to investigate whether Verizon had shared its
26 customers' records with the NSA. Verizon submitted two press
27 releases in response on May 12 and May 16, 2006, stating that (1)
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1 the NSA never requested customer records and (2) if a government
2 agency requested its customer records, Verizon would disclose them
3 only when authorized by law. Doc #1, ¶ 40. On August 9, 2006,
4 MePUC ordered Verizon to affirm under oath that its press releases
5 were accurate. Id, ¶¶ 41-42; Doc #299, Ex A, tab 5. MePUC has not
6 asked for any additional information from Verizon. See Doc #299,
7 Ex A, tab 5. On August 21, 2006, the government sued in the United
8 States District Court for the District of Maine to enjoin the MePUC
9 from pursuing this inquiry. On February 8, 2007, Judge Woodcock
10 preliminarily enjoined MePUC from enforcing the order. See United
11 States v Adams, 473 F Supp 2d 108 (D Me 2007).

12 The New Jersey case, United States v Rabner, 07-1324,
13 stems from the New Jersey Attorney General's investigation into
14 whether telecommunication carriers disclosed to the NSA telephone
15 call history data of New Jersey subscribers. Doc #1, ¶34. The New
16 Jersey Attorney General issued *subpoenas duces tecum* pursuant to
17 New Jersey consumer protection law to ten carriers doing business
18 in New Jersey. These subpoenas include the following requests:

- 19 (1) All orders, subpoenas and warrants issued by or on
20 behalf of any unit or officer of the Executive
21 Branch of the Federal Government and provided to
[the carriers] concerning any demand or request to
provide telephone call history data to the NSA;
- 22 (2) All documents concerning an identification of
23 customers * * * whose telephone call history data
24 was provided * * * to the NSA; of the persons whose
data was provided to the NSA; and
- 25 (3) All documents concerning any communication between
26 [the carriers] and the NSA * * * concerning the
provision of telephone call history data to the
NSA.

27 Doc #299, Ex A, tab 1. In response to these subpoenas, the
28 government sued the New Jersey Attorney General in the United

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1 States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Doc #1-1.
2 United States v Palermino, 07-1324, arises from a
3 complaint filed by the American Civil Liberties Union of
4 Connecticut (ACLU) requesting that the Connecticut Department of
5 Public Utility Control (CtDPUC) investigate whether the local
6 carriers violated Connecticut law. In response, the CtDPUC
7 initiated an administrative proceeding and pursued the requested
8 investigation. After the CtDPUC denied the carriers' motions to
9 dismiss, ACLU filed its first set of interrogatories to each of the
10 carriers, seeking information concerning potential illegal
11 disclosure of customer records, such as the following:

- 12 (1) Did AT&T have any published privacy policy or
13 policies concerning customer information and/or
14 records in effect between September 11, 2001, and
15 August 10, 2006?
- 16 (2) To the extent that any published privacy policy
17 referenced in your response [above] changed during
18 the relevant period, explain the specific terms
19 that changed, when the changes occurred, and the
20 reasons for the change.
- 21 (3) Without providing any details about the purpose(s)
22 or target(s) of any investigation(s) or
23 operations(s), at any time during the relevant
24 period has AT&T ever received [a court order or a
25 request under 18 USC § 2709, I e, a "national
26 security letter"] seeking disclosure of customer
27 information and/or records?

22 Doc #299, Ex A, tab 4. On September 6, 2006, the government sued
23 in the United States District Court for the District of
24 Connecticut.

25 In United States v Volz, 07-1396, the commissioner of the
26 Vermont Department of Public Service (VtDPS) propounded information
27 requests under Vermont law, 30 VSA § 206, to AT&T and Verizon
28 concerning their conduct and policies vis-à-vis the NSA. 07-1396,

1 Doc #1, Ex C. After AT&T and Verizon failed to comply with the
2 request, VtDPS petitioned the Vermont Public Service Board (VtPSB)
3 to open investigations of the carriers, Id, ¶¶ 33-34, and
4 eventually ordered the carriers to respond. Id, ¶ 37 & Ex I. This
5 prompted the government to bring suit to enjoin VtPSB in the
6 District Court of Vermont.

7 The parties' cross motions for summary judgment concern
8 three issues: whether the state officials' investigations (1)
9 violate the Supremacy Clause by regulating directly or
10 discriminating against the federal government or conflicting with
11 an affirmative command of Congress; (2) impinge on the foreign
12 affairs power of the federal government; or (3) run afoul of the
13 state secrets privilege.

14 In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court must
15 determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist, resolving
16 any doubt in favor of the party opposing the motion. "[S]ummary
17 judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is
18 'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
19 could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v
20 Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477 US 242, 248 (1986). "Only disputes over
21 facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
22 law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id.
23 And the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of
24 material fact lies with the moving party. Celotex Corp v Catrett,
25 477 US 317, 322-23 (1986). When the moving party has the burden of
26 proof on an issue, the party's showing must be sufficient for the
27 court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other
28 than for the moving party. Calderone v United States, 799 F2d 254,

1 258-59 (6th Cir 1986). Summary judgment is granted only if the
2 moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FRCP 56©.

3 The nonmoving party may not simply rely on the pleadings,
4 however, but must produce significant probative evidence supporting
5 its claim that a genuine issue of material fact exists. TW Elec
6 Serv v Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 809 F2d 626, 630 (9th
7 Cir 1987). The evidence presented by the nonmoving party "is to be
8 believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
9 favor." Anderson, 477 US at 255. "[T]he judge's function is not
10 himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter
11 but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id
12 at 249.

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14 II

15 The court takes up jurisdictional issues first.
16 In these suits, the government seeks both declaratory and
17 injunctive relief, including: (1) a declaration that state
18 investigations are invalid under and preempted by the Supremacy
19 Clause; and (2) an order enjoining the state officials from
20 investigating the carriers relating to their alleged disclosure of
21 records to the NSA. These pleadings suffice to confer federal
22 question jurisdiction under 28 USC §§ 1331 and 1345.

23 It is well-established that the federal courts have
24 jurisdiction under 28 USC § 1331 over a preemption claim seeking
25 injunctive and declaratory relief. See, e g, Verizon Md, Inc v Pub
26 Serv Comm'n of Md, 535 US 635, 641-43 (2002). In Shaw v Delta Air
27 Lines, Inc, 463 US 85, 96 & n14 (1983), the Supreme Court held:

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1 A plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief from state
2 regulation, on the ground that such regulation is
3 preempted by a federal statute which, by virtue of
4 the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must
prevail, thus presents a federal question which the
federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 USC §
1331 to resolve.

5 See also Bud Antle, Inc v Barbosa, 45 F3d 1261, 1362 (9th Cir 1994)
6 ("Even in the absence of an explicit statutory provision
7 establishing a cause of action, a private party may ordinarily seek
8 declaratory and injunctive relief against state action on the basis
9 of federal preemption."); United States v Morros, 268 F3d 695, 702-
10 03 (9th Cir 2001), citing Bell v Hood, 327 US 678, 681-82 (1946)
11 (conferring federal question jurisdiction for claims by government
12 that seek relief "directly under the Constitution or laws of the
13 United States" in challenging the actions of state officials under
14 the Supremacy Clause); Richard H Fallon, et al, Hart and Wechler's
15 The Federal Courts and the Federal System 903 (5th ed 2003).

16 An alternative ground for federal question jurisdiction
17 is furnished by 28 USC § 1345, which "provides the district courts
18 with original jurisdiction of all civil actions commenced by the
19 United States," thereby creating "independent subject matter
20 jurisdiction." Morros, 268 F3d at 702-03. Accordingly, the court
21 finds that jurisdiction lies in federal court under 28 USC §§ 1331
22 and 1345.

23 A second hurdle to reaching the merits in these cases is
24 that the government lacks an express cause of action. The
25 government describes three means of remedying this omission, one of
26 which the court can easily dispense with. The government errs in
27 arguing that the existence of jurisdiction itself gives rise to a
28 cause of action. It is firmly established by the Supreme Court

1 that the vesting of jurisdiction does not in and of itself give
2 rise to a cause of action. Texas Industries, Inc v Radcliff
3 Materials, Inc, 451 US 630, 640-41 (1981). Nor do the statutes
4 relied on for jurisdiction create substantive causes of action.
5 Hence, to secure a cause of action for these suits, the government
6 must look elsewhere.

7 One option for establishing a cause of action lies with
8 an obscure line of cases culminating in In re Debs, 158 US 564
9 (1895), which permit the government to sue to vindicate its
10 sovereign interests even when not authorized by statute. See also
11 Dugan v United States, 16 US 172 (1818); United States v Tingey, 30
12 US 115 (1831); Cotton v United States, 52 US 229 (1851); Jessup v
13 United States, 106 US 147 (1882). Debs involved an attempt by the
14 federal government to enjoin the Pullman labor strike of 1894. 158
15 US at 577. The Court upheld the propriety of the injunction,
16 proclaiming that

17 [e]very government, entrusted, by the very terms of
18 its being, with powers and duties to be exercised
19 and discharged for the general welfare, has a right
20 to apply to its own courts for any proper assistance
in the exercise of the one and the discharge of the
other * * *.

21 In spite of the Court's high-flying rhetoric, the Debs doctrine has
22 seldom been invoked in the century-plus since its inception.

23 "[R]elatively little has been made of this broad authorization to
24 sue because in most instances, the federal government has sued
25 pursuant to federal statutes and not based on its inherent interest
26 in protecting its citizens." Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal
27 Jurisdiction, § 2.3 (Aspen 2003).

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1 The contours of the doctrine enunciated in Debs remain
2 unclear, not least due to the vague guidance offered by the Debs
3 Court.

4 [I]t is not the province of the government to
5 interfere in any mere matter of private controversy
6 between individuals, or to use its great powers to
7 enforce the rights of one against another, yet,
8 whenever the wrongs complained of are such as affect
9 the public at large, and are in respect of matters
10 which by the Constitution are entrusted to the care
11 of the Nation, and concerning which the Nation owes
12 the duty to all the citizens of securing to them
13 their common rights, then the mere fact that the
14 government has no pecuniary interest in the
15 controversy is not sufficient to exclude it from the
16 courts, or prevent it from taking measures therein
17 to fully discharge those constitutional duties.

18 Debs, 158 US at 586.

19 Under its most expansive reading, Debs authorizes the
20 government to sue without statutory authorization whenever the
21 alleged violations "affect the public at large." 158 US at 586.
22 Such a broad mandate has led the government to invoke Debs in
23 varied circumstances, including in suits to enforce immunity of the
24 armed forces from certain state taxes, see United States v
25 Arlington County, 326 F2d 929 (4th Cir 1964), to enforce civil
26 rights under the Commerce Clause, see United States v Jackson, 318
27 F2d 1 (5th Cir 1963), and to enjoin sellers from obtaining default
28 judgments without proper service of process, see United States v
Brand Jewelers, Inc, 318 F Supp 1293 (SDNY 1970). Most relevant
here, the government has succeeded in invoking this doctrine in
disputes over interference with national security. United States v
Marchetti, 466 F2d 1309 (4th Cir 1972) (protection of contractual
rights in addition to national security interest). See also United
States v Mattson, 600 F2d 1295, 1298 (9th Cir 1979) ("Where

1 interference with national security has been at issue, courts have
2 also relied on the doctrine to reach the merits of the
3 controversy.”)

4 The state officials draw the court’s attention to Justice
5 Black’s concurring opinion in New York Times Co v United States,
6 403 US 713, 718 (1971), which gives reason for restraint in
7 applying Debs. Justice Black cautioned that invocation of Debs
8 invites the government – that is, the executive branch – to exceed
9 its constitutional grant to ensure that the laws are faithfully
10 executed.

11 It would, however, be utterly inconsistent with the
12 concept of separation of powers for this Court to
13 use its power of contempt to prevent behavior that
14 Congress has specifically declined to prohibit. * *
15 * The Constitution provides that Congress shall make
16 laws, the President execute laws, and courts
17 interpret laws. It did not provide for government
18 by injunction in which the courts and the Executive
19 branch can ‘make laws’ without regard to the action
20 of Congress. It may be more convenient for the
21 Executive Branch if it need only convince a judge to
22 prohibit conduct rather than ask the Congress to
23 pass a law, and it may be more convenient to enforce
24 a contempt order than to seek a criminal conviction
25 in a jury trial. Moreover, it may be considered
26 politically wise to get a court to share the
27 responsibility for arresting those who the Executive
28 Branch has probable cause to believe are violating
the law. But convenience and political
considerations of the moment do not justify a basic
departure from the principles of our system of
government.

403 US 713, 718 (1971) (citations omitted).

 In view of these separation of powers concerns, the court
agrees with the state officials that mere incantation of “sovereign
interests” does not suffice under Debs to generate a cause of
action. But even a narrow construction of Debs cannot prevent the
doctrine’s application here. Although the state officials insist

1 on casting these investigations as garden variety
2 telecommunications regulation, it cannot be gainsaid that the
3 officials' efforts bear particularly on the government's national
4 security interests. Whatever the boundaries of the Debs, the court
5 is confident that these suits fall well within its borders. See
6 Mattson, 600 F2d at 1298 ("Where interference with national
7 security has been at issue, courts have also relied on the doctrine
8 to reach the merits of the controversy."). Debs is thus properly
9 invoked by the government in these cases.

10 As an alternative to relying on Debs, the government
11 asserts that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution creates an
12 implied right of action to enjoin state regulations that are
13 preempted by a federal statutory or constitutional provision. The
14 Supreme Court implicitly supported such a right in Pharmaceutical
15 Research and Manufacturers of America v Walsh, 538 US 644 (2003).
16 Plaintiffs in that case argued - without a cause of action - that a
17 state regulation was preempted by Medicaid, a federal Spending
18 Clause statute. Only two Justices declined to reach the merits of
19 plaintiff's claim for reason that no claim was stated. The
20 remaining Justices - a plurality of four and three in dissent -
21 proceeded to the merits without pause, tacitly deciding that an
22 implied claim was stated for preemption.

23 The DC Circuit relied on Walsh in rejecting a state
24 agency's contention that plaintiffs "have no private right of
25 action for injunctive relief against the state" based on the
26 preemptive force of a federal statute. Pharmaceutical Research and
27 Manufacturers of America v Thompson, 362 F3d 819 (DC Cir 2004).

28 "By addressing the merits of the parties' arguments without mention

1 of any jurisdictional flaw," the court explained, "seven Justices
2 appear to have *sub silentio* found no flaw." 362 F3d at 819 n3. See
3 also Planned Parenthood v Sanchez, 403 F3d 324 (5th Cir 2005).

4 The court concurs with the DC Circuit's reasoning. By
5 entertaining federal preemption suits, see e g, Walsh, 538 US 644,
6 Verizon Maryland, Inc, 535 US 635 (2002), the Supreme Court has
7 cleared the path for parties to seek declaratory and injunctive
8 relief against state action on the basis of federal preemption
9 alone. This implied cause of action, in conjunction with the
10 proper invocation of Debs, provides two grounds for the government
11 to proceed in these cases.

12 Even if the government has jurisdiction and a cause of
13 action, several state officials urge this court to abstain from
14 exercising jurisdiction over these suits pursuant to the Younger v
15 Harris, 401 US 37 27 (1971), line of cases, which hold that
16 principles of comity and federalism require federal courts to
17 abstain from enjoining pending state proceedings. See also Ohio
18 Civil Rights Comm'n v Dayton Christian Schools, Inc, 477 US 619,
19 627 (1986) (extending the Younger doctrine to certain state
20 administrative proceedings, so long as those proceedings are
21 "judicial in nature").

22 In the Ninth Circuit, however, the federal government
23 may bypass the Younger hurdle when it acts as a litigant. See
24 United States v Morros, 268 F3d 695 (9th Cir 2001). According to
25 the Morros court, if the federal government seeks relief against a
26 state or its officers, it makes little sense to hew to the
27 principles of comity and federalism that animate Younger because
28 "the state and federal governments are in direct conflict before

1 they arrive at the federal courthouse," rendering futile "any
2 attempt to avoid a federal-state conflict." Id (citing United
3 States v Composite State Bd of Medical Examiners, 656 F2d 131, 136
4 (5th Cir 1981). The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Morros
5 undoubtedly applies here. The possibility of avoiding "unnecessary
6 conflict between state and federal governments," Composite State,
7 656 F2d at 136, faded long before these cases arrived to this
8 court. Because such a conflict inheres in these cases, Younger
9 abstention is inapplicable.

10 The court finally turns to the argument advanced in three
11 of these cases that no case or controversy exists because the state
12 officials have not attempted to enforce its statutes and
13 regulations against the carriers. Ripeness is one of the four
14 justiciability doctrines that stem from the Article III limitation
15 of the federal judicial power to cases or controversies.
16 Accordingly, "whether a claim is ripe for adjudication goes to a
17 court's subject matter jurisdiction * * *." St Clair v City of
18 Chico, 880 F2d 199, 201 (9th Cir 1989), quoted in Schwarzer et al,
19 Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 2:178 (1997). The standard
20 to be applied in determining if there is a case or controversy ripe
21 for resolution is whether there is "a reasonable threat of
22 prosecution for conduct allegedly protected by the Constitution."
23 Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v Dayton Christian Schools, 477 US 619,
24 626 n1 (1986).

25 Because the state officials have made plain their
26 intention to subject the carriers to investigation, the court
27 agrees with the government that the carriers face a reasonable
28 threat of prosecution and thus there is before the court a ripe

1 case or controversy. Cf Public Utilities Comm'n v United States,
2 355 US 534, 538 (1958) (allowing preenforcement review of a state
3 regulation that required common carriers to receive state
4 pre-approval before offering reduced shipping rates to the United
5 States where the state had "plainly indicated an intent to enforce
6 the Act"); see also Mobil Oil Corp v Virginia, 940 F2d 73, 76 (4th
7 Cir 1991) (allowing preenforcement review of amendments to the
8 Virginia Petroleum Products Franchise Act, which an oil company
9 claimed were preempted, even though Virginia had not specifically
10 indicated that it intended to enforce that statute against
11 plaintiffs, because the Virginia "Attorney General [had] not * * *
12 disclaimed any intention of exercising her enforcement authority").

13
14 III

15 Turning to the merits, these cases concern whether the
16 state laws underlying the investigations run afoul of the Supremacy
17 Clause, the federal foreign affairs power or state secrets
18 privilege. State law may violate the Supremacy Clause in two ways:
19 the law may regulate directly or discriminate against the
20 government, see McCulloch v Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 425-437 (1819),
21 or the law may conflict with an affirmative command of Congress,
22 see Gibbons v Ogden, 9 Wheat 1, 211 (1824); see also Hillsborough
23 County v Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc, 471 US 707, 712-713
24 (1985). The government's attack on the investigations relies on
25 both grounds of invalidity.

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It is a fundamental principle of our law "that the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they control the constitution and laws of the respective States, and cannot be controlled by them." McCulloch v Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 426 (1819). From this principle is derived the corollary that "the activities of the Federal Government are free from regulation by any state." Hancock v Train, 426 US 167, 178 (1976). As Justice Holmes observed in Johnson v Maryland, 254 US 51, 57 (1920):

[T]he immunity of the instruments of the United States from state control in the performance of their duties extends to a requirement that they desist from performance until they satisfy a state officer upon examination that they are competent for a necessary part of them.

The doctrine that embodies these principles - termed intergovernmental immunity - prevents state laws from regulating directly or discriminating against the federal government.

The Supreme Court's modern-day treatment of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine has been marked by restraint, making plain the doctrine has no application here. Although the pertinent state disclosure orders, Doc #299, Ex A, relate to federal government activities, they do not regulate the government directly; indeed, they impose no duty on the government. See United States v New Mexico, 455 US 720 (1982). The Court upheld analogous regulations in North Dakota v United States, 495 US 423, 437 (1990), which involved laws requiring out-of-state shippers of alcohol to file monthly reports and to affix a label to each bottle of liquor sold to federal military enclaves. *Id* at 426. The Court

1 reasoned that because the laws operated on suppliers, not the
2 government, "[t]here is no claim * * *, nor could there be, that
3 North Dakota regulates the Federal Government directly." Id at
4 436-37. That conclusion leaves no doubt that the state
5 investigations operate on the carriers alone.

6 Nor can it be said that the investigations "discriminate
7 against the federal government or those with whom it deals." North
8 Dakota v United States, 495 US 423, 437 (1990). The
9 nondiscrimination rule prevents states from meddling with federal
10 government activities indirectly by singling out for regulation
11 those who deal with the government. This rule does not, however,
12 oblige special treatment. A "[s]tate does not discriminate against
13 the Federal Government and those with whom it deals unless it
14 treats someone else better than it treats them." Washington v
15 United States, 460 US 536, 544-45 n10 (1983). Applying these
16 principles, the Court has required that regulations be imposed
17 equally on all similarly situated constituents of a state and not
18 based on a constituent's status as a government contractor or
19 supplier. See United States v County of Fresno, 429 US 452,
20 462-464 (1977).

21 The nondiscrimination analysis should not "look to the
22 most narrow provision addressing the Government or those with whom
23 it deals. A state provision that appears to treat the Government
24 differently on the most specific level of analysis may, in its
25 broader regulatory context, not be discriminatory." North Dakota,
26 495 US at 438. The asserted laws at issue here regulate equally
27 all public utilities, making no distinction based on the
28 government's involvement. Although the present investigation, in

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1 targeting alleged disclosure of call records to the NSA, may
2 "appear[] to treat the government differently," the regulatory
3 regime as whole treats any unauthorized disclosure the same. These
4 neutral state laws regulating the carriers "are but normal
5 incidents of the organization within the same territory of two
6 governments." North Dakota, 495 US at 435, citing Helvering v
7 Gerhardt, 304 US 405, 422 (1938).

8 The government presents an impressive patchwork of dicta
9 in support of its theory, but none of the cases it cites pertains
10 to the present facts. Hancock v Train, 426 US 167, 174 (1976), for
11 example, concerns a state attorney general's efforts to require the
12 United States Army, the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Atomic
13 Energy Commission to obtain state air pollution permits for
14 facilities on federal installations. The Hancock Court found
15 decisive the fact that the regulations "place[d] a prohibition on
16 the federal government" - a feature absent here. Both Mayo v
17 United States, 319 US 441, 447 (1943), and City of Los Angeles v
18 United States, 355 F Supp 461, 464 (CF Cal 1972), prove equally
19 unavailing for the government. In both cases, plaintiffs sought to
20 exact fees directly from a government entity. Again, no equivalent
21 interplay between the public utilities and the federal government
22 exists here.

23 In sum, because the investigations neither regulate
24 directly nor discriminate against the federal government, the
25 investigations do not violate the doctrine of intergovernmental
26 immunity.

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B

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2 The court turns to the government's preemption argument.
3 By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, it is a "fundamental principle
4 of the Constitution * * * that Congress has the power to preempt
5 state law." Crosby v Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363, 372
6 (2000) (citing US Const, Art VI, cl 2). The Supreme Court
7 cautions, however, that "despite the variety of these opportunities
8 for federal preeminence, we have never assumed lightly that
9 Congress has derogated state regulation, but instead have addressed
10 claims of preemption with the starting presumption that Congress
11 does not intend to supplant state law." New York State Conference
12 of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v Travelers Insurance Co, 514 US
13 645, 654 (1995). Accordingly, "the purpose of Congress is the
14 ultimate touchstone" of any preemption analysis. Cipollone v
15 Liggett Group, 505 US 504, 516 (1992) (citation omitted).

16 State law must yield to federal law in three situations.
17 First, state law may be preempted if Congress has expressly so
18 provided. Gade v National Solid Wastes Mgm't Ass'n, 505 US 88
19 (1992). Second, under field preemption, "[i]f Congress evidences
20 an intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling within
21 that field is preempted." Silkwood v Kerr-McGee Corp, 464 US 238,
22 248 (1984) (citing Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v de la
23 Cuesta, 458 US 141, 153 (1982)). Finally, under conflict
24 preemption, "[i]f Congress has not entirely displaced state
25 regulation over the matter in question, state law is still
26 preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law,
27 that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and
28 federal law * * * or where the state law stands as an obstacle to

1 the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
2 Congress." Id (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc v Paul,
3 373 US 132, 142-43 (1963) and Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 67
4 (1941)). The government contends that express, field and conflict
5 preemption apply to the state investigations.

6
7 1

8 State law is preempted insofar as Congress has expressly
9 stated its intent to supersede state law. Shaw v Delta Air Lines,
10 Inc, 463 US 85, 95-98 (1983). The task of statutory construction
11 of an expressed preemption clause "must in the first instance focus
12 on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the
13 best evidence of Congress' preemptive intent." CSX Transportation,
14 Inc v Easterwood, 507 US 658, 664 (1993). If Congress intends to
15 alter the usual constitutional balance between the states and the
16 federal government, it must make its intention to do so
17 unmistakably clear in the language of the statute. Rice v Santa Fe
18 Elevator Corp, 331 US 218, 230 (1947). The plain statement rule,
19 as applied to expressed preemption, "is nothing more than an
20 acknowledgment that the states retain substantial sovereign powers
21 under our constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does
22 not readily interfere." Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452, 461.

23 Little more than a paragraph in the briefing is devoted
24 to the contention that federal law - namely, the Stored
25 Communications Act ("SCA"), 18 USC § 2701 et seq - preempts
26 expressly the state laws at issue here. The SCA, which was enacted
27 as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
28 ("ECPA"), Pub L No 99-508, 100 Stat 1848 (1986), regulates

1 disclosure of non-content "record[s] or other information
2 pertaining to a subscriber." 18 USC § 2702©. Relevant to the
3 issue of preemption, the SCA specifies that "[t]he remedies and
4 sanctions described in this chapter are the only judicial remedies
5 and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter."
6 Id § 2708.

7 As the court concluded in its order denying remand in
8 Riordan, 06-3574, and Campbell, 06-3596, section 2708 of the SCA
9 serves a limited purpose: to prevent criminal defendants from
10 suppressing evidence based on electronic communications or customer
11 records obtained in violation of ECPA's provisions. Doc #130 at 6.
12 The government gives no reason to revisit this issue. Accordingly,
13 the court concludes that federal law does not expressly preempt the
14 states laws at issue here.

15
16 2

17 Even if a federal statute does not expressly preempt
18 state law, it may do so by implication. Field preemption is found
19 if the federal so thoroughly regulates a legislative field that
20 Congress intended it to be occupied exclusively by the federal
21 government. Freightliner Corp v Myrick, 514 US 280, 287 (1995).
22 If a "scheme of federal regulation * * * [is] so pervasive as to
23 make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
24 States to supplement it," or if an Act of Congress "touches a field
25 in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal
26 system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
27 same subject," field preemption exists. English v General Electric
28 Co, 496 US 72, 79 (1990); Rice, 331 US at 230. Because Congress

1 left room for state regulation of public utilities and their
2 consumers' privacy, field preemption fails.

3 As discussed in the court's remand order, see Doc #130 at
4 7, the preemptive force of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
5 Act ("FISA") is undercut by the statute's language that
6 contemplates state court litigation concerning illegal
7 surveillance. For example, section 1806(f), in pertinent part,
8 provides procedures for consideration of the propriety of FISA
9 orders "[w]herever * * * any motion or request is made by an
10 aggrieved person pursuant to any other statute or rule of * * * any
11 state before any court or other authority of * * * any state to
12 discover or obtain applications or orders of other materials
13 relating to electronic surveillance * * * ." 50 USC 1806(f). The
14 statutory exemption in 1861(e) also implies the availability of
15 civil claims with respect to the production of records. It
16 provides that a "person who, in good faith, produces tangible
17 things under an order pursuant to this section shall not be liable
18 to any other person for such production." 50 USC 1861(e). FISA
19 thus contemplates that, in the absence of a government order for
20 the business records under 50 USC 1861(a)(1), injured parties will
21 have causes of action and remedies under other provisions of state
22 and federal law.

23 These provisions in FISA suggest that Congress did not
24 intend to foreclose state involvement in the area of surveillance
25 regulation. As such, it cannot be said that the scheme of federal
26 regulation here is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the
27 inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement
28 it." English, 496 US at 79.

1
2 Finally, state action is preempted to the extent it
3 actually conflicts with federal statutes, regulations or the
4 Constitution. Barnett Bank of Marion County, NA v Nelson, 517 US
5 25, 31 (1996). Conflict preemption is found if it is "impossible
6 for a private party to comply with both state and federal
7 requirements" or if state law "stands as an obstacle to the
8 accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
9 Congress." Freightliner Corp v Myrick 514 US 280, 287 (1995);
10 Geier v American Honda Motor Co, 529 US 861, 873 (2000).

11 In support of conflict preemption, the government relies
12 chiefly on two statutory privileges, first citing to section 6 of
13 the National Security Agency Act of 1959, 50 USC § 402 note 6,
14 which provides:

15 [N]othing in this act or any other law * * * shall be
16 construed to require the disclosure of the organization
17 or any function of the National Security Agency, of any
18 information with respect to the activities thereof, or of
the names, titles, salaries, or number of persons
employed by such agency. 50 USC § 402, n6, sec 6(a)
(emphasis added).

19 The government also relies on 50 USC § 403-1(i)(1), which states,
20 "[t]he Director of National Intelligence shall protect intelligence
21 sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." The overarching
22 issue is whether compliance with both federal and state regulations
23 is a physical impossibility or whether the state investigations
24 "stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes
25 and objectives of Congress." Silkwood, 464 US at 248. For reasons
26 discussed below, the court finds that neither of these provisions
27 compels preemption.

28 //

1 Compliance with both federal and state regulations is not
2 a physical impossibility, at least in view of "the circumstances of
3 [the] particular case." Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc v
4 Paul, 373 US 132, 142-43 (1963). "What is a sufficient obstacle is
5 a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal
6 statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended
7 effects." Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363, 373
8 (2000)

9 For when the question is whether a Federal act
10 overrides a state law, the entire scheme of the
11 statute must of course be considered and that which
12 needs must be implied is of no less force than that
13 which is expressed. If the purpose of the act
14 cannot otherwise be accomplished -- if its
operation within its chosen field else must be
frustrated and its provisions be refused their
natural effect -- the state law must yield to the
regulation of Congress within the sphere of its
delegated power.

15 Crosby, 530 US at 373 (citing Savage v Jones, 225 US 501, 533
16 (1912)).

17 Applying this standard, the court cannot conclude that
18 the state investigations will inevitably conflict with federal law.
19 In Hepting, 06-672, the government argued that the information
20 covered by the section 6 statutory privilege is "at least co-
21 extensive with the assertion of the state secrets privilege by the
22 DNI." 06-672, Doc #124 at 14. Insofar as section 6 proscribes
23 disclosure that would otherwise fall within the state secrets
24 privilege, no conflict exists, as the government may intervene and
25 assert the state secrets privilege in any of these proceedings. A
26 conflict may arise, however, to the extent the state officials seek
27 information covered by section 6 that lies outside the scope of the
28 state secrets privilege. The court doubts whether any of the these

1 investigations would engender such a conflict, especially given the
2 government's insistence that all information sought by the state
3 officials implicates the state secrets privilege. Regardless, it
4 would be inappropriate for the court to rule on the scope of this
5 possible conflict in the abstract. See Time Warner Entm't Co, LP v
6 FCC, 56 F3d 151, 195 (DC Cir 1995) ("[W]hether a state regulation
7 unavoidably conflicts with national interests is an issue incapable
8 of resolution in the abstract.").

9 Under the obstruction strand of conflict preemption,
10 state law is preempted to the extent it actually interferes with
11 the "methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach
12 [its] goal." Int'l Paper Co v Ouellette, 479 US 481, 494 (1987);
13 Verizon North, Inc v Strand, 309 F3d 935, 940 (6th Cir 2002). In
14 making this determination, courts "consider the relationship
15 between state and federal laws as they are interpreted and applied,
16 not merely as they are written." Jones v Rath Packing Co, 430 US
17 519, 526 (1977); Time Warner, 56 F3d at 195 ("[W]hether a state
18 regulation unavoidably conflicts with national interests is an
19 issue incapable of resolution in the abstract.") (quoting Alascom,
20 Inc v FCC, 727 F2d 1212, 1220 (DC Cir 1984)). Hence, obstruction
21 preemption focuses on both the objective of the federal law and the
22 method chosen by Congress to effectuate that objective, taking into
23 account the law's text, application, history and interpretation.

24 To support obstruction, the government avers that any
25 litigation touching upon the statutory privileges must *ipso facto*
26 obstruct Congress' purpose. But such a view misapprehends the
27 federal law's purpose by ignoring the bulk of Congress's activity
28 in this realm. For example, inquiry into activity not sanctioned

1 by the Pen Register Act, 18 USC § 3121, or FISA, falls outside of
2 section 6's ambit. The Pen Register Act provides that "no person
3 may install or use a pen register or a trap and trace device
4 without first obtaining a court order under section 3123 of this
5 title [18 USCS § 3123] or under the [FISA]." 18 USC § 3121(a).
6 Similarly, FISA requires an application under oath attesting to
7 eleven qualifying conditions, including the purpose of the
8 investigation, and the persons to be investigated, as well as that
9 the information likely to be obtained is foreign intelligence
10 information not concerning a "United States person." 50 USC §
11 1804(a)(1) to (11). Both of these statutes counter the
12 government's myopic view of federal law in this area.

13 In further support of its conflict-preemption argument,
14 the government points to 18 USC § 798(a), a statute that makes it a
15 crime to divulge improperly any classified information "concerning
16 the communication intelligence activities of the United States."
17 18 USC § 798(a). Because the disclosure under the subpoenas is not
18 "authorized," such disclosures may violate federal law. Yet the
19 term "classified information" for purposes of 18 USC 798(a) means
20 "information which, at the time of a violation of this section, is,
21 for reasons of national security, specifically designated by a
22 United States Government Agency for limited or restricted
23 dissemination or distribution." 18 USC § 798(b). And the
24 government does not purport to have designated as classified the
25 records at issue here; indeed, it has not acknowledged that the
26 carriers even divulged records to the NSA. As such, no conflict
27 exists with 18 USC §798(a) until the government "specifically
28 designate[s]" the records pertinent to the cases at bar. Even if

1 the pertinent records fall under 18 USC § 798(a), the
2 aforementioned statutory privileges – not to mention the state
3 secrets privilege – furnish the government with more than enough
4 protection against any conflict.

5 Finally, the government contends that presidential
6 executive orders aimed at protecting national security information
7 conflict with the state investigations. Executive orders, in and
8 of themselves, do not preempt state law. Congress has the
9 exclusive power to make laws necessary and proper to carry out the
10 powers vested by the United States Constitution in the federal
11 government. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579
12 (1952). Only when executive orders are necessary as a means of
13 carrying out federal laws do they preempt state law. Cf Fidelity
14 Federal Sav & Loans Ass'n, 458 US at 154 (administrative
15 regulations may preempt state law when Congress has delegated that
16 rule-making power).

17 Executive order 12,958 directs agencies to control
18 strictly the classified information in their possession and to
19 ensure that information is disclosed only when doing so is "clearly
20 consistent with the interests of national security." 60 Fed Reg
21 19825. Similarly, executive order number 12,968 (60 Fed Reg 40245)
22 establishes a security program for access to information by non-
23 government employees and 36 CFR § 1222.42(b) requires that when
24 "nonrecord material containing classified information is removed
25 from the executive branch, it is protected under conditions
26 equivalent to those required of executive branch agencies * * *."

27 The government attempted to explain why these orders are
28 necessary as a means of carrying out federal laws, as required for

1 preemption, for the first time at oral argument. Without the
2 benefit of briefing, however, it remains uncertain whether these
3 executive orders amount to anything more than mere expressions of
4 executive will. But even supported by an act of Congress, these
5 orders cannot carry the day for the government. Again, no conflict
6 inheres because for any information sought in violation of these
7 orders the government may exercise its privileges, statutory or
8 otherwise.

9 Accordingly, the government cannot show the requisite
10 conflict because, based on the present record, the investigations
11 do not require an act by the carriers that federal law or policy
12 deems unlawful. Nor do the investigations pose an obstacle to the
13 purposes and objectives of Congress. Should it occur that
14 information sought by the states implicates the aforementioned
15 executive orders but falls outside the state secrets privilege, the
16 court will entertain a renewed motion from the government based on
17 conflict preemption.

18
19 C

20 Even if no federal activity preempts the state laws at
21 issue here, the state investigations are said to infringe on the
22 foreign affairs power of the federal government under Zschernig v
23 Miller, 389 US 429 (1968). The national government's exclusive
24 authority to regulate the foreign affairs of the United States has
25 long been recognized as a constitutional principle of broad scope.
26 See United States v Pink, 315 US 203, 233 (1942) ("Power over
27 external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the
28 national government exclusively."); Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52,

1 63 (1941). "It follows that all state action, whether or not
2 consistent with current foreign policy, that distorts the
3 allocation of responsibility to the national government for the
4 conduct of American diplomacy is void as an unconstitutional
5 infringement on an exclusively federal sphere of responsibility."
6 Laurence H Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 4-5 at 656 (3d ed
7 2000).

8 This principle, which prohibits state action that unduly
9 interferes with the federal government's authority over foreign
10 affairs, derives from both the text and structure of the
11 Constitution. The Constitution allocates power for external
12 affairs to the legislative and executive branches of the national
13 government and simultaneously prohibits the states from engaging in
14 activities that might interfere with the national government's
15 exercise of these powers. To be sure, no clause in the
16 Constitution explicitly bestows a "foreign affairs power" to the
17 federal government. See L Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United
18 States Constitution 14-15 (2d ed 1996). But a number of
19 provisions, when read together, strongly imply that such authority
20 was intended. See Harold G Maier, Preemption of State Law: A
21 Recommended Analysis, 83 Am J Int'l L 832, 832 (1989) ("[N]either
22 the Articles of Confederation nor the Constitution provided for a
23 general foreign affairs power. Nonetheless, there was never any
24 real question that the United States would act as a single nation
25 in the world community.").

26 Specifically, the Constitution provides that Congress
27 possesses the authority "to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts
28 and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense

1 and general Welfare of the United States," US Const art I, § 8, cl
2 1, "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," id, cl 3, and "to
3 define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,
4 and Offences against the Law of Nations," id, cl 10. Additionally
5 Congress is granted the power "to declare War, grant Letters of
6 Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
7 Water," id, cl 11, and the President is designated the "Commander
8 in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States," id, art II, §
9 2, cl 1.

10 With respect to the states, the Constitution directs that
11 "no State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation;
12 grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal" or, without the consent of
13 Congress, "lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports" or
14 "enter into any Agreement or Compact * * * with a foreign Power,"
15 or "engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent
16 Danger as will not admit of delay." Id, § 1, cl 10.

17 These and other constitutional provisions evidence an
18 intent on the part of the framers to grant paramount authority for
19 foreign affairs to the political branches of the federal
20 government, thereby necessitating the exclusion of intrusive
21 efforts on the part of the states in foreign relations. The
22 Supreme Court enshrined these principles in Zschernig v Miller, 389
23 US 429 (1968), in which the Court announced the foreign affairs
24 doctrine that governs the cases at bar.

25 Zschernig involved an Oregon probate statute that
26 conditioned the inheritance rights of an alien not residing in the
27 United States on his ability to prove that American heirs would
28 have a reciprocal right to inherit estates in the foreign country

1 and that he would receive payments from the Oregon estate "without
2 confiscation, in whole or in part, by the governments of such
3 foreign countries." Id at 430. The Supreme Court noted that it
4 had earlier refused to invalidate a similar statute enacted by
5 California "on its face" because that statute would have only "some
6 incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries." Id at 432-33
7 (quoting Clark v Allen, 331 US 503, 517 (1947)). In Zschernig,
8 however, the Court assessed "the manner of [the Oregon statute's]
9 application" and observed that the law had compelled state courts
10 to "launch[] inquiries into the type of governments that obtain in
11 particular foreign nations." 389 US at 433. The Court noted, for
12 example, that the statute triggered assessments of "the actual
13 administration of foreign law" and "the credibility of foreign
14 diplomatic statements." Id at 435. In short, the statute "seemed
15 to make unavoidable judicial criticism of nations established on a
16 more authoritarian basis than our own." Id at 440. Looking at these
17 effects of the Oregon statute, the Court concluded that it was
18 unconstitutional because it "affected international relations in a
19 persistent and subtle way," had a "great potential for disruption
20 or embarrassment" and triggered "more than 'some incidental or
21 indirect effect in foreign countries.'" Id at 434-35, 440.

22 Zschernig thus stands for the proposition that states may
23 legislate with respect to traditional state concerns, such as
24 inheritance and property rights, even if the legislation has
25 international implications, but such conduct is unconstitutional
26 when it has more than an "incidental or indirect effect in foreign
27 countries." Id at 440. As the First Circuit recently observed,
28 under Zschernig, "there is a threshold level of involvement in and

1 impact on foreign affairs which the states may not exceed."
2 National Foreign Trade Council v Natsios, 181 F3d 38, 49-57 (1st
3 Cir 1999), aff'd on other grounds sub nom, Crosby v National
4 Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363 (2000).

5 But Zschernig, and the foreign affairs power it
6 announced, has its limits. Only a handful of state or local laws
7 have been struck down under Zschernig, and these laws have
8 typically singled out foreign nations for regulation. See, e g,
9 Natsios, 181 F3d 38, 53 (finding that the Massachusetts Burma Law,
10 which restricted the ability of Massachusetts and its agencies from
11 purchasing goods or services from companies that did business with
12 Burma (Myanmar), was unconstitutional, in part, as a "threat to
13 [the] federal foreign affairs power"); Tayyari v New Mexico State
14 University, 495 F Supp 1365, 1376-79 (D NM 1980) (striking down a
15 university's policy designed to "rid the campus of Iranian
16 students" because it conflicted with a federal regulation and
17 "frustrated the exercise of the federal government's authority to
18 conduct the foreign relations of the United States"); Springfield
19 Rare Coin Galleries, Inc v Johnson, 115 Ill 2d 221 (Ill 1986)
20 (invalidating an Illinois statute that excluded South Africa from a
21 tax exemption as more than an "incidental" intrusion on the federal
22 government's foreign affairs power); Bethlehem Steel Corp v Board
23 of Commissions, 276 Cal App 2d 221 (1969) (invalidating a
24 California Buy American statute because it had "more than 'some
25 incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries' and * * * great
26 potential for disruption * * * .").

27 The Ninth Circuit's decision in Deutsch v Turner Corp,
28 324 F3d 692 (9th Cir 2003), sheds light on the present issues.

1 Deutsch affirmed this court's decision in In re World War II Era
2 Japanese Forced Labor Litig, 164 F Supp 2d 1160 (ND Cal 2001),
3 finding preemption of a California law that created a cause of
4 action for victims of World War II slave labor. The Ninth Circuit
5 stated that California had "sought to create its own resolution to
6 a major issue arising out of the war - a remedy for wartime acts
7 California's legislature believed had never been fairly resolved."
8 Id at 712. Because the power to make and resolve war included the
9 authority to resolve war claims, the California scheme was
10 preempted by the federal scheme. Id at 714. As this court
11 observed, the statute's terms and legislative history "demonstrate
12 a purpose to influence foreign affairs directly" and "target[]
13 particular countries," as "California intended the statute to send
14 an explicit foreign relations message, rather than simply to
15 address some local concern. In re WWII, 164 F Supp 2d at 1173,
16 1174.

17 In contrast to the law in Deutsch, none of the state laws
18 the government seeks to preempt was enacted to influence foreign
19 affairs. Nor can it be said that any state has attempted to
20 "establish its own foreign policy." 389 US at 441. Instead, the
21 laws underlying the state investigations are directed at more
22 mundane, local concerns such as utility regulation and privacy,
23 traditional realms of state power.

24 Nor is there a basis for concluding that the
25 investigations of the carriers will have significant impact on the
26 government's relations with any foreign nation. In this regard,
27 Int'l Ass'n of Indep Tanker Owners v Locke, 148 F3d 1053, 1068 (9th
28 Cir 1998), is instructive. The Ninth Circuit in Locke rejected out

1 of hand the argument that onerous regulations on oil tankers
2 promulgated by the state of Washington were unconstitutional under
3 Zschernig because the litigant "failed to demonstrate that, even if
4 [those] regulations [had] some extraterritorial impact, that impact
5 [was] more than 'incidental or indirect.'" Locke, 148 F3d at 1069
6 (quoting Zschernig, 389 US at 434). Akin to the regulations in
7 Locke, the state investigations may have an effect on foreign
8 affairs, but that effect is only incidental and indirect. See
9 Zschernig, 389 US at 433.

10
11 D

12 Finally, the court takes up how the state secrets
13 privilege bears on the state officials' investigations. The
14 Director of the NSA, General Keith B Alexander, has concluded that
15 permitting the investigations to proceed would interfere with the
16 national security operations of the government. Doc #265, Ex A.
17 Alexander's declaration explains that each of the "five of the
18 state proceedings * * * seek, at a minimum, information regarding:
19 (1) whether specific telecommunication carriers assisted the NSA
20 with an alleged foreign intelligence program involving the
21 disclosure of large quantities of records pertaining to customer
22 communications; and (2) if such a program exists, the precise
23 nature of the carriers' alleged involvement and details concerning
24 the alleged NSA activities." Doc #265, Ex A, ¶ 16. According to
25 Alexander, confirming or denying "allegations concerning
26 intelligence activities, sources, methods, relationships, or
27 targets" would harm national security in various ways. Id, ¶ 17.

28 //

