Education and Training Series

Stare Decisis

Federal Judicial Center
STARE DECISIS

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"The law must be stable, yet it cannot stand still." The words are those of Roscoe Pound. They refer to the two ideals that must be harmonized and reconciled: stability and change. Stability requires a continuity with the past, and is necessary to permit members of a society to conduct their daily affairs with a reasonable degree of certainty as to the legal consequences of their acts. Change implies a variation or alteration of that which is fixed and stable. Without change, however, there can be no progress. Let us explore the function of **stare decisis** in the judicial process in attaining these two seemingly contradictory goals.

Basic to our discussion is the understanding that, in the common law world, a judicial decision serves a dual function. First, it settles the controversy, that is, under the doctrine of **res judicata** the parties may not relitigate the issues that have been decided. Second, in the common law system, under the doctrine of **stare decisis**, the judicial decision also has precedential value. The doctrine, from **stare decisis et non quieta movere**, "stand by the decision and do not disturb what is settled," is rooted in the common law
policy that a principle of law deduced from a judicial decision will be considered and applied in the determination of a future similar case. In essence, this policy refers to the likelihood that a similar or like case arising in the future will be decided in the same way.

In a common law system, where the law is enunciated and developed through judicial decisions, the doctrine of stare decisis is absolutely essential. It was indispensable in the early periods of the common law when legislative enactments were few and usually limited to public law.

Stare decisis was received in the United States as part of the common law tradition. In addition to fostering stability and permitting the development of a consistent and coherent body of law, it also served other beneficial functions. It preserved continuity, manifested respect for the past, assured equality of treatment for litigants similarly situated, spared judges the task of re-examining rules of law with each succeeding case, and afforded the law a desirable measure of predictability. These concepts, developed in the course of hundreds of years of judicial experience, require further consideration as a result of
today's massive legislative activity. Since the doctrine of precedents continues to serve a useful and beneficial function, it is always appropriate to examine and re-examine its applicability and limitations.

What is the doctrine of stare decisis, and what are its inherent limitations? It must be understood that the decided case, that is, the precedent, is almost universally treated as no more than a point of beginning. The decided case is said to establish a principle, and it is indeed a principium, a beginning, in the true etymological sense of the word.

A principle is a fundamental assumption that does not foreclose further inquiry. As a point of departure or beginning, the common law judge affirms or asserts the pertinence of a principle extracted from the precedent found to be in point. He then proceeds to apply it by molding or shaping that principle to meet the needs of deciding the case at bar. The process of application, whether it results in an expansion or a restriction of the principle, is more than a mere gloss; it represents the judge's distinct contribution to the growth and development of the law.
Discussing precedents, in *The Nature of the Judicial Process*, Mr. Justice Cardozo wrote: ¹

... in a system so highly developed as our own, precedents have so covered the ground that they fix the point of departure from which the labor of the judge begins. Almost invariably, his first step is to examine and compare them. If they are plain and to the point, there may be need of nothing more. *Stare decisis* is at least the everyday working rule of our law.

In the application of a precedent, the jurist must determine the **authority** of the precedent. Is the authority **binding**, or is it merely persuasive? If it is **binding**, the principle established in the prior case must be applied, and determines the disposition of the subsequent case. If it is only **persuasive**, a variety of additional factors may be considered to ascertain whether it will be applied, and the extent or degree of its application.

An accurate description of the doctrine of **stare decisis** will contain a statement of the limitations upon its applicability. A few definitions, set forth by those who have explored the doctrine in depth,

may be helpful. For example, Henry Campbell Black, in his Law of Judicial Precedent, stated:¹

A decision is not authority as to any questions of law which were not raised or presented to the court, and were not considered and decided by it, even though they were logically present in the case and might have been argued, and even though such questions, if considered by the court, would have caused a different judgment to be given.

Black thus highlights the importance of the issues presented in the prior case. Were the issues presented, considered and decided? If they were not, even though they could have been, the prior decision is not a binding precedent.

Of course, the issues raised in a case stem from the facts presented. The facts of the case, therefore, are of the utmost importance. The Latin maxim, ex facto oritur jus, tells us that the law arises out of the facts. Of particular relevance are the following observations by Professor Brumbaugh:²

Decisions are not primarily made that they may serve the future in the form of precedents, but rather to settle issues between litigants.

¹Black, Law of Judicial Precedent 37 (1912).
²Brumbaugh, Legal Reasoning and Briefing 172 (1917).
Their use in after cases is an incidental aftermath. A decision, therefore, draws its peculiar quality of justice, soundness and profoundness from the particular facts and conditions of the case which it has presumed to adjudicate. In order, therefore, that this quality may be rendered with the highest measure of accuracy, it sometimes becomes necessary to expressly limit its application to the peculiar set of circumstances out of which it springs.

Hence, the authority of the precedent depends upon, and is limited to, "the particular facts and conditions of the case" that the prior case "presumed to adjudicate."

Precedents, therefore, are not to be applied blindly. The precedent must be analyzed carefully to determine whether there exists a similarity of facts and issues, and to ascertain the actual holding of the court in the prior case. The precedent is studied to determine whether the principle deduced therefrom is the holding of the case or merely dictum. Only the holding of the case is entitled to recognition and respect as binding authority. A dictum is only a remark or observation, and is, at best, merely persuasive authority. The factors that affect or determine the degree of persuasiveness that is accorded to dicta are many and varied. How pertinent or relevant
is the dictum to the decision wherein it was uttered? Does the court or judge who authored the dictum enjoy a special respect for scholarship and wisdom? Is the dictum reasonable?

The distinction between the holding of a case and its dicta is warranted by the nature of the adversary system that prevails in the common law. The reason for the distinction was expressed as follows by Chief Justice John Marshall:

It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the court is investigated with care and considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated.

Hence, the holding of a prior case is limited to the principle or rule that was necessary for the resolution of those factual and legal issues actually

\[1\] Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821).
presented and decided. All utterances not necessary
to the decision are **dicta**.

That a binding decision arises only as a result
of litigation has led to a criticism of the doctrine of
precedents. Allen, in *Law in the Making*, observed:¹

Nor is it entirely unjust criticism that
precedents tend to make the development
of law depend on accidents of litigation.
Important points may remain at large
simply because nobody happens to have
brought action upon them. An erroneous
judgment may stand, and acquire an un-
deserved authority, merely because the
losing party does not appeal it—usually
for the excellent reason that he cannot
afford any further costs of litigation.

A further limitation upon the binding authority
of precedent may be noted from the following quotation
from a decision of the Court of Appeals of the State
of New York:²

But the doctrine of stare decisis, like
almost every other legal rule, is not
without its exceptions. It does not
apply to a case where it can be shown
that the law has been misunderstood or
misapplied or where the former determin-
ation is evidently contrary to reason.
The authorities are abundant to show
that in such cases it is the duty of the
courts to reexamine the question.


N.Y. 79, 85 (1892).
Similar language of Chancellor Kent is also worthy of quotation:

A solemn decision upon a point of law arising in any given case, becomes an authority in a like case, because it is the highest evidence which we can have of the law applicable to the subject, and the judges are bound to follow that decision so long as it stands unreversed, unless it can be shown that the law was misunderstood or misapplied in that particular case.

For Chancellor Kent, a decision that is entitled to precedential value as binding authority is one that is "solemn." The proposition of law deduced from the prior case must have been necessary for the decision of that case, and is authority only in a like case. Clearly, a subsequent case may be distinguishable on the facts or on the issue presented.

Chancellor Kent also wrote of the possibility of a "reversal," of the prior decision upon a showing that the law "was misunderstood or misapplied in that particular case." Reflecting upon the possibility of demonstrating that a prior case was erroneously decided, Mr. Justice Field has stated that "it is more important that the court should be right upon later and more

\[1\] Kent, Commentaries 475 (12th ed. 1896).
elaborate consideration of the cases than consistent with previous decisions."\(^1\)

These quotations indicate the limitations which surround the application of the doctrine of stare decisis. Experience indicates that in most cases precedents may be distinguished on the facts or the issues presented. There is also the possibility of showing that the prior case was erroneously decided and contrary to reason. Hence, although all prior cases have precedential value, their value as precedents may differ radically.

Is the principle deduced from the prior case contained in a thorough, well-reasoned opinion which was, itself, based upon clear and binding precedents? Is the precedent one that is seriously weakened by a trenchant dissent, or by a concurring opinion which casts doubt upon the wisdom of the majority opinion? Is the applicable principle found in a single case, or has it been restated and applied in several cases which have reaffirmed its value and social desirability? Clearly, the authoritative value of precedents varies widely. At one extreme are those precedents found binding;

at the other extreme are those precedents found to be completely inapplicable to the present case.

The doctrine of *stare decisis* thus does not require unbending adherence to past decisions. It permits a court to benefit from the wisdom of the past, and yet reject the unreasonable and erroneous. First, the court must determine whether the principle extracted from the prior case is applicable. Second, the court must determine to what extent the principle will be applied.

A court may choose to extend a principle beyond the prior case if it believes that such action will promote justice. If the application of the principle, however, would produce an undesirable result the court will narrow or restrict the principle, or may apply a different precedent. It must be noted, therefore, that *stare decisis* is not merely a doctrine of stability and uniformity. Its inherent restrictions and limitations, as well as the factors that render prior decisions inapplicable, make possible the necessary flexibility required for change and progress.

In a common law system, discussions of *stare decisis* often proceed as though the system itself is
the same as that which prevailed centuries ago. Ours is still a common law system in which prior decided cases have precedential value. A most important new element, however, has been added to the blend of authorities that must be considered by the judge in the decision of cases. In the past, particularly in the field of private law, judicial consideration dealt essentially with the authority of prior decided cases. Seldom did legislative enactments bear upon cases. The common law system of the modern world, however, must cope with the legislative policy expressed or implied in a multitude of pertinent statutes.

Since the common law system developed on a case-to-case basis, and the presence of legislative policy was minimal or unusual, legislation came to be regarded almost as an alien field. Mr. Justice Cardozo acknowledged the sense of unease with legislation when he said,¹ "The truth is that many of us bred in common law traditions, view statutes with a distrust which we may deplore, but not deny." Chief Justice Stone, writing of the attitude of unfamiliarity with statutes, stated that

¹Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science 8 (1928).
"the common law courts have given little recognition to statutes as starting points for judicial lawmaking comparable to judicial decisions."¹

Legislation may directly, and indeed abruptly, change or repeal a legal standard, principle, or rule. Courts, however, may only legislate to fill an omission or lacuna in a statute. To use the words of Mr. Justice Holmes: "I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially,...."² There is no doubt that judges, of course, must decide a casus omissus, the "unprovided for case," for which no specific provision is made in the statute. As with judicial precedents, courts may, and in practice do, expand or restrict the application of the legislative policy. This, as is well known, is done pursuant to the declared judicial policy of giving effect to the legislative intent expressed or implied in the pertinent statute.

Today, legislation so extensively covers practically every branch of law, both public and private,


²See Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (dissenting opinion).
that the principle or point of beginning can no longer be presumed to be a judicial precedent. Often, the point of beginning must be the legislative policy set forth in a relevant statute. Courts, of course, must interpret and apply statutes. The system, nevertheless, requires that courts examine judicial precedents that have previously interpreted and applied them. At this point, however, a more serious question is injected into the process. Judges may have a tendency to attribute more significance to the judicial precedents than to the legislative policy that those precedents purported to interpret and apply. Courts are thus faced with the difficult task of determining the relative weight that must be attributed to legislative policy and to judicial precedent. Surely, it is a judicial function to interpret and apply a statute. Under our tripartite system of government, however, the court must be faithful to the legislative purpose and policy. The judge cannot forget that ours is a government of three branches, and that, in deciding cases, he is fulfilling an institutional responsibility of the court.

Undue or unwarranted reliance upon judicial precedents, in the face of relevant and perhaps
overriding legislative policy, has caused Dean Erwin Griswold to decry what he has termed "judicial leapfrogging." Although his remarks were directed toward an unduly expansive judicial attitude in construing the United States Constitution, his criticism is also applicable to the interpretation and application of statutes. Dean Griswold spoke of the danger of the process as follows: ¹

The danger here, as elsewhere, is that a sort of decisional leapfrogging takes over as a principle expands: the first decision is distilled from the language of the Constitution, but the next expansion begins from the reasoning of the last decision, and so on down the line until we reach a point where the words of the Constitution are so far in the background that they are virtually ignored. In the end we may be left with a rationale that comes to little more than, 'Well, it really is a good idea. We want a free society where all of these things can be done and we want to keep the Government off the backs of the people'. There are governmental processes for bringing such results about, but it is hard to think that such adumbrations of the Constitution are an appropriate exercise of judicial power.

The possibilities and variations are infinite. Many examples can be found in the law books. I should

like to give one example found in the case of Girouard v. United States,\textsuperscript{1} decided by the Supreme Court in 1946. Girouard filed a petition for naturalization. He stated that he understood the principles of the government of the United States, believed in its form of government, and was willing to take the statutory oath of allegiance. The oath provided that he would support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic. To a question in the naturalization application: "If necessary, are you willing to take up arms in defense of this country?", Girouard replied: "No (non-combatant), Seventh Day Adventist."

In an effort to do justice in the particular case, perhaps by the subconscious application of Aristotelean epikeia (epieikeia), the District Court admitted Girouard to citizenship. On the clear and unmistakable authority of three Supreme Court decisions,\textsuperscript{2} the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the facts brought the case squarely within the principle

\textsuperscript{1}328 U.S. 61 (1946).

of the cited Supreme Court cases. The issue raised in the three Supreme Court precedents was the statutory construction of the congressional mandate that an alien, before admission to citizenship, declare on oath that he will "defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same." These statutory provisions construed in the earlier case were reenacted by the Congress. Despite this clear indication of congressional approval of the Schwimmer-Macintosh-Bland rationale, the Girouard Court overruled these cases.

The principle of the prior cases was crystal clear. Unless the alien was willing to answer affirmatively to the question in the application, whether if necessary, he would be willing to take up arms in defense of this country, he would not be admitted to citizenship. That those three cases stood for the proposition asserted could not be denied since the Supreme Court recognized in a fourth case,\textsuperscript{1} that an alien who refused to bear arms would not be admitted to citizenship.

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{In re} Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
Mr. Justice Stone, for cogent reasons, joined in the dissents of Chief Justice Hughes in the Macintosh and Bland cases. Adopting substantially the same rationale expressed in those dissents, the Supreme Court, in Girouard, reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals. In admitting Girouard to citizenship, even though he refused to state that if necessary he would bear arms, the Court stated: "We conclude that the Schwimmer, Macintosh and Bland cases do not state the correct rule of law."

One would think that Chief Justice Stone and the other Justices who dissented in the prior cases, would have regarded the express reversal of the prior cases, and the adoption of their dissenting views, as a genuine vindication. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Stone again dissented in the Girouard case. He began his dissent by stating:

I think the judgment should be affirmed, for the reason that the court below, in applying the controlling provisions of the naturalization statutes, correctly applied them as earlier construed by this Court, whose construction Congress has adopted and confirmed.

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1Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 70 (1946).
Chief Justice Stone indicated that, in the prior cases, the "only question was one of construction of the statute which Congress at all times has been free to amend if dissatisfied with the construction adopted by the Court." He explained that, with three other Justices, he dissented in the Macintosh and Bland cases, "for reasons which the Court now adopts as ground for overruling them." Because of his firm view that Congress had adopted and confirmed the Court's earlier construction of the naturalization statutes, he regarded the Court's overruling of those cases as judicial action that would discourage, if not deny, "legislative responsibility."

With Mr. Justices Reed and Frankfurter joining in his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Stone concluded, at page 79, that: "It is not the function of this Court to disregard the will of Congress in the exercise of its constitutional power."

These cases clearly demonstrate the differing judicial views that prevail. Chief Justice Stone, in effect, stated that his dissenting opinions were not the law of the land. If they were to be adopted, to effect a change in the law as set forth in those earlier
cases, such a policy determination should have been made by the Legislature.

Of course, it was a judicial question whether the principle of law enunciated in the earlier cases had been adopted by the Congress. This question was whether there had been legislative acquiescence in the judicial construction of the statute. In his dissent in Girouard, Chief Justice Stone noted that six successive Congresses declined to adopt proposals or amendments that would have overturned the rulings in Schwimmer, Bland and Macintosh--the three cases expressly overruled by Girouard. He also noted, in his dissent in Girouard, that prior to Girouard the state and federal courts had consistently applied the rule or principle espoused in the three prior cases.

There was little doubt that those earlier cases, until overruled by Girouard, represented the law of the land. Consequently, the state and federal courts acted correctly and properly in applying the principle for which these cases stood. Indeed, Chief Justice Stone quoted from one pre-Girouard case\(^1\) wherein the Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out that proposed amendments

\[^{1}\text{Beale v. United States, 71 F.2d 737, 739 (8th Cir. 1934).}\]
to the statutes at issue had been rejected, and stated: "We must conclude, therefore, that these statutory requirements as construed by the Supreme Court have congressional sanction and approval."

The Girouard example suggests that one's philosophy about the separation of powers of the branches of government may also play a vital role in determining judicial attitudes toward judicial precedents and legislative policy. The factors are many that a judge will intuitively, deliberately, or unconsciously consider in determining the weight to be given to prior judicial pronouncements. Is the court dealing with an isolated precedent or a series of well-reasoned opinions? Has the precedent that is being urged upon the court been eroded by decisions that have restricted its application? Have changed conditions rendered the precedent obsolete? With what degree of authority may the Court speak? Surely, if the court can speak with finality on a particular question, it will determine for itself the particular balance that will be struck between stability and change. The court will make a value judgment as to the desirability of following the past or effecting change. If the decision is to bring about change, we can only hope that it be progress.