Legal Arguments
The trial of Matthew Lyon
The arguments of the federal district attorney against Matthew Lyon were as follows:
1. Lyon, as charged in the indictment, wrote the letter published in Spooner’s Vermont Journal, and he repeatedly read a letter written by Joel Barlow at public gatherings.
2. The offensive passages cited in the indictment clearly fit within the definition of libel set out in the Sedition Act.
3. Lyon declared his intention to undermine support and respect for the federal government.
Charles Marsh, the federal attorney for the District of Vermont, called several witnesses to establish that Lyon’s letter to Spooner had arrived in Vermont and was set in type after the passage of the Sedition Act. Other prosecution witnesses testified that Lyon had read the letter “from a diplomatic character in France” at several public events, and that at one of the events a listener responded with a call for revolution. Marsh also produced evidence that Lyon’s wife had delivered to the printer a copy of the Barlow letter in Lyon’s handwriting.
Marsh addressed the jury with a lengthy argument that Lyon’s published writings demonstrated an intent to defame the government.
Lyon’s defense consisted of the following:
1. The court had no jurisdiction because the Sedition Act was unconstitutional. Even if the act were constitutional, it would be unconstitutional for the court to apply the act to writings composed before the passage of the act.
2. Lyon did not intend to defame the President or the government.
3. The contents of the publications were true, and thus did not violate the Sedition Act.
Lyon, who had no legal training, served as his own counsel at the trial. He called as his only witness the presiding justice, William Paterson, in a not-too-serious attempt to prove the truth of his allegedly libelous writings about President Adams’ taste for pomp. When prosecution witnesses testified that Lyon had read the Barlow letter to public gatherings and produced a “tumult,” Lyon elicited their admission that the “tumult” would not have occurred without the provocation of two Federalists in the crowd.
Lyon presented his defense in a two-hour address to the jury. He argued that none of his actions amounted to “anything more than a legitimate opposition.”
The trial of Thomas Cooper
The arguments of the federal district attorney against Thomas Cooper were as follows:
1. Cooper clearly and repeatedly demonstrated “a malicious and deliberate intention to injure the character of the President.”
2. Cooper took advantage of his legal training and his writing skills to disseminate seditious principles in a remote area where the people were more easily deceived.
William Rawle, the federal attorney for the District of Pennsylvania, emphasized Cooper’s intent to defame President Adams. Despite Cooper’s insistence that he was only criticizing the public conduct of Adams, Rawle argued that “the whole tenor” of Cooper’s remarks was an assault on the character of the President. Cooper had furthermore compounded his original libel by repeating his criticism of Adams in court and distorting the government’s policies through a highly selective reading of public documents.
All civilized nations, Rawle asserted, punished seditious libel and recognized the danger presented by unchecked criticism of legitimately elected governments. The publication of seditious writings challenged the will of the people by undermining public confidence in elected leaders. Rawle argued that Cooper’s behavior was particularly dangerous because he was a gifted writer who wrote for a poorly informed audience. Rawle told the jury “it was necessary that an example should be made to deter others from misleading the people by such false and defamatory publications.”
Cooper’s defense consisted of the following:
1. The statements in the handbill were true and accurate descriptions of the actions of President Adams, and thus by the terms of the Sedition Act could not be considered seditious libel.
2. An objective examination of the public conduct of the President could not in itself be seditious libel.
Cooper, who was trained as a lawyer, served as his own counsel. The greatest part of his defense was based on a detailed review of President Adams’ conduct in an effort to prove the truth of the statements made in the handbill. Cooper relied on numerous public documents to establish the policies carried out or supported by Adams. Cooper also hoped to subpoena the President and various members of Congress to testify, but Justice Samuel Chase refused the subpoena of the President and ruled that the subpoena of members of Congress would require a delay of the trial until the adjournment of Congress.
Although Cooper did not directly challenge the constitutionality of the Sedition Act, he argued that the act’s restrictions on public debate and its intimidation of any political opposition undermined citizens’ ability to make informed decisions in elections. Acknowledging that a genuine libel on the President should be punished, Cooper insisted that his published handbill was an objective criticism of the policies of Adams, not an attack on the President’s character.
The trial of James Callender
The arguments of the federal district attorney against James Callender were as follows:
1. Callender wrote and published the passages cited in the indictment.
2. The cited passages were clearly malicious, and the malicious tone was sufficient to establish Callender’s intent to defame the President.
3. The constitutional right to participate in elections, to withdraw support for an incumbent officeholder, and to speak out in favor of a new candidate did not include a right to “vilify, revile, and defame” the opposing candidate.
Thomas Nelson, the federal attorney for the District of Virginia, devoted most of his attention to establishing Callender’s role in writing and publishing The Prospect Before Us, which was the basis of the indictment. The succession of witnesses involved in the publication and dissemination of the pamphlet described an almost conspiratorial collaboration between Republican printers and political leaders.
Nelson also offered the jury a defense of the Sedition Act based on a widely held Federalist definition of legitimate political speech. Once citizens elected an official, public criticism of that officeholder threatened to silence the voice of the people.
Callender’s defense consisted of the following:
1. Juries in Virginia had the power to consider and decide questions of law as well as the facts of the case, and since the Constitution was the supreme law of the land, the jury had the power to declare the Sedition Act unconstitutional.
2. The Sedition Act made falsehood an essential component of seditious libel, but the indictment cited statements of opinion that could not be proved true or false.
3. A defendant tried under the Sedition Act could present evidence and call witnesses to establish the truth of one portion of the publication cited in the indictment, rather than address the truth of the entire publication.
The prominent attorneys who defended Callender emphasized broad legal challenges to the Sedition Act rather than a focused defense of their client. William Wirt, who later became the longest-serving U.S. attorney general, asserted that juries had the power to consider the constitutionality of the statute under which a defendant was charged. Many Republicans supported this argument, and Justice Chase was determined to prevent its application in a federal court. Philip Nicholas, who was attorney general of Virginia, emphasized the absurdity of trying to prove the truth of a political opinion. The confrontation with Justice Chase over the presentation of evidence and the subpoena of witnesses was part of an effort to establish the authority of state procedures in federal court proceedings. The lawyers withdrew from the case in protest of Justice Chase’s interference with their defense.
The Sedition Act Trials — Historical Background and Documents