History of the Federal Judiciary


History of the Federal Judiciary


  Olmstead v. United States: The Constitutional Challenges of Prohibition Enforcement
Historical Documents

Amicus curiae brief of telephone companies submitted to the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. United States

The leading telephone companies of the day and their business association filed an amicus curiae brief, which is a way for a person or group interested in the case, but not a party to the case, to submit a statement of related legal arguments. Clearly fearful that telephone companies would suffer if people thought that their telephone conversations were not private, the telephone industry argued that the telephone had “become part and parcel of the social and business intercourse of the people.” It was a public service just like the mails and therefore was deserving of protection under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, as well as through the existing state laws.

[Document Source: Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).]


Messrs. Otto B. Rupp, Charles M. Bracelen, Robert H. Strahan and Clarence B. Randall on behalf of The Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company, American Telephone and Telegraph Company, United States Independent Telephone Association, and the Tri-State Telephone and Telegraph Company, as amici curiae, filed a brief by special leave of Court.

The petitioners were using the telephone lines and facilities of the local telephone company, such as were available to everyone without discrimination. The function of a telephone system in our modern economy is, so far as reasonably practicable, to enable any two persons at a distance to converse privately with each other as they might do if both were personally present in the privacy of the home or office of either one. When the lines of two “parties” are connected at the central office, they are intended to be devoted to their exclusive use, and in that sense to be turned over to their exclusive possession. A third person who taps the lines violates the property rights of both persons then using the telephone, and of the telephone company as well. . . .

It is of the very nature of the telephone service that it shall be private; and hence it is that wire tapping has been made an offense punishable either as a felony or misdemeanor by the legislatures of twenty-eight States, and that in thirty-five States there are statutes in some form intended to prevent the disclosure of telephone or telegraph messages, either by connivance with agents of the companies or otherwise.

The wire tapper destroys this privacy. He invades the “person” of the citizen, and his “house,” secretly and without warrant. Having regard to the substance of things, he would not do this more truly if he secreted himself in the home of the citizen.

In view of what this Court has held as to the intent and scope of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, it would not seem necessary to enter into any meticulous examination of their precise words. But if that be done, does not wire tapping involve an “unreasonable search,” of the “house” and of the “person”? There is of course no search warrant, as in the nature of the case there could not be. If the agent should secrete himself in the house or office to examine documents, would not that constitute a “search”? Is the case any different in the eyes of the law if from a distance the agent physically enters upon the property of the citizen, as he does when he taps the wire, and from that point projects himself into the house? Certainly in its practical aspect the latter case is worse than the first, because the citizen is utterly helpless to detect the espionage to which he is subjected.

If it be said that, in any event, there is no “seizure,” that an oral conversation cannot be seized, we answer, in the first place, that this is a purely superficial view, which puts the letter above the spirit and intent of the law. The “privacy of life” and the liberty of the citizen have been invaded. And, in the second place, we do not understand that seizure is a necessary element to constitute the offense. An unreasonable search alone violates the Fourth Amendment. It is enough that the federal officer has made an unreasonable search, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and has thereby unlawfully obtained evidence. The evidence so obtained is excluded under the provisions of the Fifth Amendment.

The Government itself provides the mail service, a public service, and the Government authorizes the telephone company to provide the telephone service, also a public service. It is settled that the communication in the mail is protected. Upon what reason, then, can it be said that the communication by telephone is not protected?

The telephone has become part and parcel of the social and business intercourse of the people of the United States, and the telephone system offers a means of espionage compared to which general warrants and writs of assistance were the puniest instruments of tyranny and oppression.

The telephone companies deplore the use of their facilities in furtherance of any criminal or wrongful enterprise. But it was not solicitude for law breakers that caused the people of the United States to ordain the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as part of the Constitution. Criminals will not escape detection and conviction merely because evidence obtained by tapping wires of a public telephone system is inadmissible, if it should be so held; but, in any event, it is better that a few criminals escape than that the privacies of life of all the people be exposed to the agents of the Government, who will act at their own discretion, the honest and the dishonest, unauthorized and unrestrained by the courts. Legislation making wire tapping a crime will not suffice if the courts nevertheless hold the evidence to be lawful. Writs of assistance might have been abolished by statute, but the people were wise to abolish them by the Bill of Rights.

 

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